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This thesis reviews the historical, political, and cultural foundations for establishing 
seafood industrial clusters at Zhoushan Islands, explaining the organizational level management, 
operation, and regulatory strategies utilized by seafood factory owners to achieve their success. 
This thesis explores the general labor pattern, the surveillance and hierarchies in seafood 
factories at Zhoushan Islands, inequalities and social stratification in the nearby local rural 
community, and the invisible consequences of state-led industrialization and rural transformation 
policies in the Zhoushan industrial cluster. A theme running through this discussion is how 
factory owners utilize available political, social, and economic capital from the elite social 
networks to build their pathway to succeed in operating seafood business, countering barriers, 
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“What we do know, and what we can assert without further hesitation, is that the universe had a 
beginning. The universe continues to evolve. And yes, every one of our body’s atoms is traceable 
to the big bang and to the thermonuclear furnaces within high-mass stars that exploded more 
than five billion years ago. We are stardust brought to life, then empowered by the universe to 
figure itself out – and we have only just begun.” 
 
-Neil deGrasse Tyson, 2017 
 
Excerpt from Astrophysics for People in a Hurry 
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How people get the nutrition they need for survival, is one of the essential questions in 
every human society. From hunting and gathering, cultivating and planting, to purchasing fresh 
and processed food from grocery stores, social structure and people’s livelihoods in the food 
system have changed dramatically over the past several centuries, with the establishment of the 
capitalist world system (Howard 2016). With the rise of contemporary globalization and 
intensified interconnections beyond national boundaries since late 1980 (Steger 2017), the 
industrialized seafood system was introduced to modern China. China’s central government 
promoted the seafood industry in its market liberalization framework, with policies supporting 
rapid state-led industrialization, urbanization and massive domestic rural-to-urban labor 
migration (Huang 2015; McNally 2012). These changes redefined the dietary structure and 
consumption pattern in urban China, as well as transformed social relations in China’s rural areas 
(Veeck and Burns 2005).     
The seafood processing zone at Zhoushan Islands was established as a national project to 
boost economic development in the east coast of China, through promoting fishing 
industrialization and strengthening domestic connections to the global market. Rising seafood 
production in China mirrors a worldwide trend, especially in Asian countries along the coast of 
the Pacific. For instance, intensive shrimp farming took root and boomed in Thailand since the 
1980s (Huitric, Folke, and Kautsky 2002); the labor-intensive seafood processing contributed 
significantly to national income in Vietnam from 1992 to 2002 (Hong and Le 2008); and 
increasing the export of seafood products is widely utilized by many developing countries as the 
feasible strategy to facilitate economic development (Watson et al. 2017). The Chinese 
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government implemented a set of national and local policies to direct capital, resources, and 
credit to state-designated Free Trade Pilot Zones.  
Zhoushan seafood industry cluster was established based on the Chinese government’s 
national development and economic upgrading strategy. Fueled by state-owned fishery trading 
enterprises, a newly built seafood industrial cluster at Zhoushan Islands was founded in 1985 
which tapped abundant non-government funds from domestic private investors (Zhoushan 
Chorography 1992). The Zhoushan Islands seafood processing zone now represents an important 
industrial cluster in the eastern coast of China. 
Since its founding, Zhoushan seafood industry cluster has reshaped local power relations 
and concentrated private capital. Family-managed seafood processing factories have been 
established at Zhoushan Islands and now represent the major enterprises in this industry cluster. 
A local clique comprised of historically powerful families have manipulated the growth of 
seafood industry to consolidate its power. Notable families and great clans have concentrated 
their control over capital, scarce resource and information flows through the intertwined social 
network which connecting elites across political, economic, and social spheres. In addition to the 
Chinese government’s modernization and industrialization policies, and Rural Revitalization 
Development strategies, new patterns of labor migration and organization have transformed rural 
communities in this area.  
This thesis utilizes qualitative methods to investigate the rise of the seafood processing 
industry at Zhoushan Islands, focusing on how local factory owners have created their pathways 
to success, and how local inequalities and social stratification have been shaped through the 
corresponding process of rural transformation. Primary data was collected through 216-hours of 
on-site fieldwork in the Zhoushan Islands of China from 2019 to 2020. Complementing this field 
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research, I have collected and analyzed documents from China’s central and local governments 
to show how official fishing industrialization and modernization policies have worked to 
construct the seafood industrial cluster, promote rural revitalization, and fuel rural community 
transformation. This thesis provides a comprehensive analysis of the historical, political, social, 
and cultural roots of opportunities and challenges in the seafood industrial cluster at Zhoushan 
Islands and related rural transformation processes. This study is significant in demonstrating the 
active role played by the state, local authorities, and great family clans in facilitating regional 
development and reshaping individuals’ livelihoods with the rise of the seafood processing 
industry at Zhoushan Islands. As this thesis will demonstrate, while the specific processes 
shaping the seafood industry may be unique to China, this study provides general insights 
applicable to understanding seafood industry development in other East Asian countries.  
Additionally, this thesis is significant for two reasons. Firstly, this study contributes to the 
existing scholarship of industrial clusters by illustrating how personal social networks enable 
seafood factories to succeed. Specifically, this study brings in fresh insight into how factory 
owners’ social capital enables them to manipulate capital, information, and resource 
concentration in industrial clusters. Secondly, this thesis makes connections between the rise of 
seafood processing, inner rural village stratification, and stratified factory structure at Zhoushan 
Islands considering China’s political economy. It reviews multi-dimensional government policies 
aiming to facilitate the local economy through promoting seafood processing and rural tourism. 
Then this thesis illustrates the unexpected consequences that resulted from such policies: instead 
of achieving rural revitalization and improving life quality for the unprivileged, these policies 
produced new internal village inequalities and turned the marginalized rural residents to wage 
laborers in seafood factories and other service sectors. However, compared to other migrant 
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workers, local residency and dialect speaking enable some local workers exclusive advantages in 
seafood factories, which shapes the stratified factory labor arrangement in Zhoushan seafood 
industrial cluster.       
 This thesis is organized into seven chapters as outlined below. This chapter introduces the 
study background, primary research question and discusses the broader sociological significance 
of this thesis. Chapter two reviews two major theoretical frameworks – political economy and 
modernization theory, which inform the conceptual framework for this research. This chapter 
discusses major arguments from these two theoretical frameworks and reviews key concepts and 
arguments which lay the contextual foundation for this thesis. I analyze political economy views 
of development and the rise of industrial clusters, Michel Foucault’s discussion of power and 
governmentality, and the specific characteristics of China’s political economy. I analyze 
modernization theory’s contribution to scholarships on industrial clusters and ecological 
modernization, then provide a detailed discussion of China’s major modernization policies and 
processes. Chapter three discusses my methodology, research questions, research design, data 
collection, coding scheme, and analysis process for this project. Qualitative methods discussed in 
this chapter are fundamental to understand the complex political, historical, cultural, and social 
contexts in this field study.  
The subsequent chapters provide my empirical analysis. Chapter four analyzes the 
establishment of the seafood industrial cluster at Zhoushan Islands. This chapter reviews the 
local context and identifies the major agencies, facilities and policies which are key to the 
functioning of seafood processing in this cluster. I describe two major types of seafood factories 
involved in this industrial cluster - government and family-managed businesses. Then I outline 
the importance of familiar based social networks in this industry cluster. Chapter five provides a 
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detailed analysis of the stratified factory structure, focusing on labor migration, labor 
organization, and gender issue. Chapter six focuses on the processes of rural community 
transformation related to the rise of seafood processing at Zhoushan Islands. This chapter 
reviews China’s rural urbanization and revitalization policies and their unintended negative 
impacts on rural villages at Zhoushan Islands, shows how rural tourism and unequal social 
resource distribution increase income inequality and further rural social stratification, and how 
the marginalized rural villagers are forced to sell their labor in seafood factories and other sectors 
to make a living. As the conclusion, Chapter seven summarizes major arguments made by this 
thesis, discusses the pathway utilized by most seafood factory owners to succeed at Zhoushan 
Islands, and outlines the challenges and opportunities for workers. By the end, it also outlines 
lingering questions and suggestions for future research focusing on different levels of analysis, 
and considers the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the seafood processing industry at 



















In this chapter, I will review two major sociological paradigms as the theoretical 
foundations for this thesis - political economy and modernization theory. First of all, I will 
discuss major theoretical arguments of political economy, reviewing a body of literatures about 
the state and Michel Foucault’s theory of power and governmentality and provide a review of 
scholarship about industrial clusters. This political economy literature informs my 
comprehensive review of China’s political economy and the unique historical, social, political 
and economic contexts of modern China. Secondly, I will review modernization theory, its 
intellectual roots and major theoretical arguments, then discuss ecological modernization as a 
new trend in the post-industrial era. This informs my detailed discussion of China’s 
modernization process which emphasizes industrialization and urbanization, and the agricultural 
transformation and ecological civilization policies proposed by the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) to address recent social problems resulting from rapid modernization, such as asymmetric 
rural-urban development and unequal social resource distribution. Finally, I will explain why the 
theoretical frameworks mentioned above are appropriate to this thesis, which can help to analyze 
the complex socio-political-economic contexts in modern China and frame the general pattern of 








Major Political Economy Theoretical Arguments 
In contrast to neo-classical economics which focuses on the effect of financial logic and 
free market in shaping the economy, political economy focuses on the role played by 
governmental agencies in discipling, facilitating and modifying private economic organizations’ 
activities in the market (Howard 2016). Rooted in Karl Marx’s historical materialism, the 
political economy approach emphasizes how economic activities in society are affected and 
organized by power relations and social relations, as well as how these relations are redefined, 
normalized, and institutionalized to produce social order (Hoogvelt 2001; Streeck 2011). This 
approach takes a broad view, explaining economic activities in society by drawing on political, 
cultural, social and historical studies which reveal how power is expressed and transformed 
between governmental agencies and private economic actors, as well as how “economic interests 
and constrains influence policy, politics and social life as a whole” (Howard 2016; Streeck 
2011:138).  
A substantial political economy literature explains recent processes of globalization. 
Alongside the technology boom of instant communication and transportation, intensified 
international interconnections make national affairs across political, economic and cultural areas 
no longer isolated from the global system, people’s destiny is interlinked and interrelated (Steger 
2017; Held and McGrew 2007). Giant business entities and transnational investors have sprung 
up since the 1980s, dominating the economy, spreading neoliberalism and fueling economic 
globalization (Steger 2017). In the face of globalization, economic activities have become 
beyond national government’s control. East Asian states have sought to guide their development 
trajectories, but have faced great challenges from the global market and the increased domestic 
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desire for democracy, which require new governing mechanisms and innovative state-led 
policies to achieve continuous economic growth (Yeung 2017). The role of state in facilitating 
and redirecting national development and industrial transformation has shifted and been 
redefined with the “changing international geopolitical contexts” (Yeung 2017:84-87). These 
trends raise new questions regarding the national political economy framework in relation to the 
distribution of power and governmental regulatory scheme. 
 
Power and Governmentality 
 The discursive perspective of power lies at the center of Michel Foucault’s analysis of 
power relations in society. For Foucault, power is immanent, it comes from everywhere and 
stands by its own, it raises from the intertwined relations instead of coming from the outside 
settings in society, as he stated, “power is not an institution, and not a structure, neither is it a 
certain strength we are endowed with, it is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical 
situation in a particular society” (Foucault [1978] 1990:93). Through force relations, power 
serves as the internal condition for relationships linking different individuals, groups and 
institutions in society together, with the resistance and struggle embedded in the power system 
(Foucault [1978] 1990). According to Foucault’s perspective, power is often exercised with 
specific goals but does not result from individual’s decisions (Foucault [1978] 1990). Power and 
knowledge or legitimated truth join together in the discourse of power, of which both power and 
the resistance against such power can be transformed and (re)produced. Discourse provides 
individuals the guidelines based on the dominant expert knowledge to frame their thinking and 
regulate their behavior, which generates the condition for achieving self-regulation through 
governmentality in modern society.  
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For Foucault, governmentality is a scheme of mentality to govern the population. 
Through collecting demographic data and information from the governed, the governor is able to 
manage social problems and govern the population, especially regulating individual’s bodies in 
society (Foucault [1978] 1991). By legitimatizing certain kinds of expert knowledge as the 
legitimatized truth and setting up dense surveillance in society, individuals internalize the 
guideline that regulate their behavior without questioning it and take certain ideologies for 
granted. In that way, the population can be governed. However, as Foucault claimed, there is no 
division between accepted and excluded discourses. Discourse is fluid and multiple strategies 
can be applied to (re)produce, transform and update itself ([1978] 1990), which leaves room for 
new knowledge to emerge from the forced relations in society. The framework of 
governmentality can be utilized to analyze the forced relations between factory owners, 
administrative layer workers and migrant workers in Zhoushan seafood industrial cluster, to 
explore how workers internalize factory regulations to self-govern their behaviors in the factory, 
as well as how factory owners install surveillant facilities and employ trusted followers to 
enforce the control of worker’s bodies and secure their domination in the factory.      
 
Industrial Cluster, Labor, and Gender  
Industrial cluster is a policy-based regional arrangement with “geographic concentrations 
of interconnected companies and institutions in a particular field”, which is often closely linked 
to reassembled institutions who can provide “specialized training, education, information, 
research, and technical support”, such as university research centers, specialized infrastructure 
providers and knowledge-sharing institutions (Negoita and Block 2012:6; Porter 1998:78). 
Therefore, as an important part of national development strategy, industrial cluster is often 
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located at the gateways of a country as the hub of international and domestic trading, as well as a 
headstream of technology innovation. As a key in state development strategy, industrial cluster 
can promote regional industrial specialization, spatial concentration, economic growth and 
upgrading (Hassink, Isaksen, and Trippl 2019; Barbieri, Tommaso, and Bonnini 2012). In 
industrial cluster, value can be produced in the given location according to the price and 
availability of labor, resource and raw material - new socio-spatial interactions and connections 
are established (Henderson et al. 2002; Prodi, Nicolli, and Frattini 2017). However, local 
community cannot always benefit from the establishment of industrial cluster. The industrial 
cluster may benefit the national economy as a whole but it may not necessary benefit individual 
local residents, it depends on the government policy, firm ownership and corporate governance 
in that area (Henderson et al. 2002). 
Most East Asian newly industrialized countries adopted the export-oriented development 
strategy since the 1970s (Gereffi 1994). In East Asia, state policy and governmental 
infrastructural support created necessary conditions for the establishment of industrial cluster and 
export-oriented processing zone (Gereffi 1994). Some scholars claimed that attributing to the 
strong role played by East Asian states in directing national economy with “managed 
liberalization”, high economic growth rate has been maintained without increased social 
inequality in East Asian societies (Held and McGrew 2007). The developmental state theory 
explains East Asia’s success as the complex of the ongoing state political design to optimize 
production structure, the highly-centralized institutional arrangement enables the state to control 
domestic capital and resource flow, as well as state policies to direct major production into 
sectors with increasing returns to facilitate national economy (Wade 2018). Embedded autonomy 
enables the developmental state in East Asia to maintain close relationships with capitalists, in 
 
 11 
this context, the state can regulate and discipline capitalists as well as direct domestic and 
international capital flow (Evans 1989).    
Labor arrangements and labor migration are key elements in the formation of  industrial 
clusters. Alongside neoliberal globalization, the transnational systems of production emerged 
with the increasing interconnection and fragmentation of global production networks in the 
global economy (Coe and Hess 2013). This transnational production system involves capital 
freely moving around the world to seek cheap raw material, resources and labor (Steger 2017). 
Peasants and working-class populations from the Global South are targeted by capital, they are 
linked to international consumers through global production networks (Henderson et al. 2002). 
Since China’s economic reform in the late 1970s, foreign investors and transnational enterprises 
started to establish operations and production chains in mainland China (Ma and Jacobs 2010). 
Responding to a huge demand for labor in these factories, a new working class was created 
through the proletarianization of migrant peasants in reform-era China (Chan and Pun 2009). 
Millions of migrant workers fuel China’s industrialization, creating “world factories” for global 
economy (Chan and Pun 2009; Ye 2013). Migrant peasant workers are directly connected to the 
global market. China’s national economy benefits from the sacrifice of migrant workers, but the 
necessary state support and protection to migrant workers is “almost missing” (Chan and Pun 
2009:291).  
In China, young single rural women migrated to urban industrial clusters to accept  
exhausting jobs because of the lack of rural opportunities and their desire to live as modern 
women (Pun 2005). Most migrant rural women would return to their rural villages to get married 
and fulfill their roles of caregiver in the patriarchal families (Pun 2005). But over recent years 
China’s traditional rural society has been slowly torn down by market-based economy, leaving 
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few opportunities for rural populations, and rural women often have to migrate with their 
husbands to cities again to support their families (Ye 2011).    
There is a clear gendered division of labor in world factories. Women’s traditional 
characteristics enable them to “perform delicate work” with their “nimble fingers” in these 
factories (Barrientos, Dolan, and Tallontire 2003:1514). Women are often assigned to do value 
adding work like packaging in the horticultural industry and other tedious typical “female work” 
like cleaning or cooking (Barrientos et al. 2003). Female jobs in factories are often organized by 
informal employment relations and are poorly paid, compared to typical male jobs (Barrientos et 
al. 2003). As Raynolds noted, women’s unpaid farm labor plays a key role in fulfilling farming 
contracts, especially for household-based agricultural production which demands intensive daily 
care work (2002). In traditional societies like rural China, women are expected to take care of 
families and housework, while men are supposed to be breadwinners and in charge of affairs 
outside home. Women’s enormous labor in housework, labor reproduction and other informal 
sectors are often overlooked (Raynolds 2002; Patel-Campillo 2012). Any work landing in the 
household sphere is often considered as female work. 
 
China’s Political Economy 
The political economy is varied from country to country: a significant difference between 
most Western developed countries and Eastern developing countries is the location of power. In 
Western capitalist societies “market power” appears to lie “inside rather than outside the typical 
giant corporation” which form the core of the economy (Rowlinson and Hassard 2000). In other 
words, the power from government is minimized in a neoliberal capitalist society to guarantee 
the freedom of corporations and facilitate economic success.  
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In Eastern developing countries the state holds more power, particularly in authoritarian 
states like China which intervene in shaping the national economy. In China power is centralized 
in the hands of official authorities and being distributed from the top to down. The government 
maintains its “ultimate control” over and directs major economic activities, creating China’s 
distinctive form of political and economic structure (Liu, Sun and Woo 2006:2016; Beeson 
2010).  
The central government of People’s Republic of China (PRC) has pursued policies 
favoring industrial clusters to fuel economic growth. At the early stage of industrialization, 
China prioritized heavy industries like coal and steel in its first Five-Year Plan in early 1950 to 
facilitate national economy and development. Till the mid-1980s, light industry boomed after 
China’s marketization reform and manufacturing industry like garment was introduced by 
China’s central government to southern China to facilitate regional development (Szirmai, 
Naudé, and Alcorta 2013). Other high-tech industries like cutting-edge technologies took root in 
China after the 1980s.  
In addition to policies facilitated manufactory industrial clusters, China’s central 
government has proposed to establish marine industrial cluster in coastal regions (Zhang and Ji 
2019). Seafood processing zone and marine industry have grown rapidly in the east coast of 
China as part of regional development plan to promote economic upgrading. The value of marine 
production in China has increased from 2,159.24 billion RMB to 60,699.91 billion RMB from 
2006 to 2014 (Zhang and Ji 2019). In recent years, China’s central government has started to pay 
attention to environmental problems resulting from rapid modernization and economic growth, a 
set of policies for sustainable development are proposed by the state. State policies for ecological 
protection restrict marine industries to discharge wastes and request marine companies to install 
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pollution treatment facilities to protect marine ecology. Studies on China’s marine industrial 
cluster and its most recent changes are limited; this thesis will help increase the understanding of 
this growth and its social consequences.       
Surveillance is another important aspect of China’s political economy. China’s political, 
economic and social systems are designed based on Karl Marx’s doctrine (Wang and Blyth 
2013). Marx believes that surveillance is important to shape power relations and social relations 
in society. According to this view, surveillance is “a coercive and technological method for 
controlling and disciplining workers” fueling capital accumulation in economic sphere, as well 
as “a political process of domination” handling “political and cultural potentials for counter-
surveillance” to maintain the ruling class’s power in the political sphere (Fuchs 2013:675). The 
second claim for political order is utilized by China’s central government to guide its national 
economy, stabilize its political domination, as well as maintain government desired social order.  
In traditional China’s rural society, social relations in the patriarchal system are 
organized around farmland. Social control, morality, ethic, blood and marriage relations, as well 
as social hierarchy are based on people-land relations (Fei, Hamilton, and Wang 1992). A deeply 
rooted patriarchal regulatory structure is created. Every person attached to the same land 
constitute a dense surveillant web: people watch each other and any deviant behaviors are 
perceived as a threat to community solidarity. Men from great family clans and local authorities 
with high prestige often act as the “family master” who can make decisions for the whole local 
community (Fei et al. 1992). In this context, the rural society was “ruled by men”, which 
proposing traditional moralities and local authorities’ wisdom above the laws stated in 
government documents. This deeply rooted traditional patriarchal regulatory regime is in conflict 
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with China’s political modernization strategy which intends to create a modern regulatory 
mechanism ruled by laws.    
Additionally, for Marx, one essential step to achieve communism and let the proletarian 
control their destiny is eliminating private property (Rowlinson and Hassard 2000). As a socialist 
government which claims to stand for the people, capitalist property right is constrained and 
developed slowly in modern China. At the macro-level, attributing to China’s specific historical, 
economic and political conditions, the country’s whole economic system is closely surveilled 
and carefully planned by its central government. Since the late 1980s, state managed capitalism 
based on “market-oriented incentives” has developed in China, starting from “state-owned, state-
sponsored, or private yet state-loyal corporations and wealth funds” and promoting national 
economy without challenging China’s ruling ideology (Liu et al. 2006; McNally 2012:742). In 
this circumstance, the state can maintain its socialist nature and legitimatize its dominant status 
in society. Economic activities can only be performed within the state guided macroeconomic 
political framework, any undesired actions beyond the legal boundaries or which are seen as 
harming the interests of the state are prohibited and forced to cease (Fuchs 2013).  
At the micro-level, small to medium state-owned enterprises have boomed in China since 
the 1990s, with the involvement of rapidly growing private investment groups (Liu et al. 2006). 
Instead of elaborating a national industrial democracy, “subnational” economic strategies 
pursued by local authorities play a key role in promoting regional and local economic 
development in China (Rithmire 2014). The “subnational innovation spaces” between central 
government and local administrations allow local authorities to create and apply place-based 
development policies within the overall national development plan (Prodi et al. 2017). In other 
words, local development is directed by local administration’s interpretation and implementation 
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of national reform policies published by China’s central government (Rithmire 2014). For this 
reason, different economic consequences can be observed in different regions of China. China’s 
national economy is not a self-driven system, but a group of interrelated social institutions based 
on relations, which are historically constructed and continually restructured through social 
interaction between governmental agencies, local authorities and particular actors.  
State-owned and private economic organizations imitate China’s centralized state 
bureaucracy and establish their regulatory mechanism following the same logic to control the 
behavior of workers. China’s political economy is shaped by a familiar relation-based network 
form of capitalism called “Sino-capitalism” (McNally 2012). In this economic system “the 
Chinese state (takes) a leading role in fostering and guiding capitalist accumulation” and 
privatization, which is organized around “informal business networks” grounded in cultural-
based “interpersonal relationships utilizing common Chinese cultural norms that cultivate long-
term reciprocal personal relationships (guanxi in Chinese)” (McNally 2012:744-750).  
Over recent years with the intensified interconnections to the global market, China’s 
central government has taken a step back to give more room for market competition. In this “2-
R” strategy the Chinese state seeks to “retain governmental control of large enterprises (over) 
strategic sectors” and “retreat from small and medium-sized enterprises that operate in highly 
competitive markets” in the national economy (Liu et al. 2006:2016). Although the decentralized 
“2-R” strategy intends to promote fair market competition to some extent, China’s central 
government still is unlikely to adopt the industrial democracy after thirty-years of market 
reformation (Rithmire 2014). Since the state acts as the major shareholder in the national 
economy, central and local governmental authorities and actors may create unpredictable 
influence on the economic system (Wang 2015). Economic advantages and institutional 
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domination can be exclusively secured by private agencies through maintaining social 
connections to particular political actors with political capital (Nee and Opper 2010).  
Who wins and who loses in the game of state-supervised capital accumulation? As 
McNally stated, the interpersonal relationships in China (guanxi) play an important role in 
creating “production and knowledge clusters”, which may widen regional disparities and produce 
new inequalities in society (McNally 2012:75; Rithmire 2014). Social inequalities alongside the 
rapid institutional change may widen the wealth gap between the urban and the rural, especially 
between individuals who have necessary interpersonal relationships and who not, creating new 
systems of social stratification through structural wage labor migration and other processes 
(Walder 2002).   
The above discussion illustrates why political economy is a necessary conceptual 
framework to analyze China’s managed macroeconomic national economy and why China is a 
special case in the field of development study. To date scholars have not fully explained the 
processes by which social resource and capital has been relocated and concentrated into the 
hands of the few through the network of interpersonal relationships in China’s industrial-rural 
continuum. This thesis will contribute to this explanation, helping fill this research gap.    
 
Modernization Theory and Modernization Process in Mainland China 
Major Modernization Theoretical Arguments 
Built on neoclassical economic theories, modernization theory discusses how a 
“developing” country progresses from backwards, uncivilized to advanced, modern state with 
abundant economy. This approach assumes that every country is on the same track but at 
different development stages; the only single-direction linear way a country can take from 
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developing to developed is through industrialization, urbanization and technology innovation 
(Peet and Hartwick 2015). In addition to material achievement, all the Western-based modern 
ideas of “encouraged mobility, rationality, and empathy” are also waiting there to be awakened 
through development (Peet and Hartwick 2015:142). Within this theory, individuals in 
developing countries can be modified in the modernization process – from traditional men to 
modern men with all these modern Western values (Huntington 1968). 
This theocratical approach sees traditional society as less developed but a prerequisite 
status for developed modern society (Rostow 1960). Since modernization theory views human 
beings as “inherently rational and self-interested”, their economic decisions in the free market 
will benefit the economy as a whole and produce social welfare as well as increase life quality 
for everyone (Peet and Hartwick 2015:33). Although modernization interprets progress as 
continuous economic growth with great level of industrialization, with the claim that institutional 
changes in society can be fostered alongside economic prosperity, this view neglects other 
aspects of development (McMichael 2012). The modernization perspective ignores specific 
historical, political, social and economic contexts in different countries as well as other 
dimensions of development beyond economic achievement and poverty alleviation, such as the 
level of happiness, mental health, traditional cultural inheritance and the reproduction of social 
relations in local society.  
According to modernization theory, social changes can happen at different levels. At the 
national level, domestic national development relies heavily on the great level of 
industrialization (Rostow 1960). With the establishment of new industrial production relations, 
political and social institutions are reformed to better facilitate this modern economic model. As 
Huntington argued, in modern society, “rationalized authority, differentiated structure, and mass 
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participation thus distinguish modern polities from antecedent polities” (1968:89). The political 
system is thus seen as moving toward to a highly-efficient, advanced and scientific bureaucratic 
system which is designed to facilitate the modern national economy. According to modernization 
theory, inequality is one of the by-products of development, but it can be eliminated when 
society progresses to a more developed status (Norberg 2003). Turning to the local level, 
modernization theory proposes that traditional agriculture will be gradually replaced by more 
profitable industrial manufacturing sectors. While peasants are turned into wage labor who rely 
on salaries for survival; individuals start to migrate to big cities and industrial clusters for better-
paid jobs (Rostow 1960; McMichael 2012). Consequently urbanization is accelerated as another 
important indicator of modernization. 
 
Ecological Modernization  
 
Beyond interpreting the cause of environmental deconstruction and degradation, 
ecological modernization is proposed by Western scholars as a systematic approach to address 
environmental problems caused by industrialization, which is defined as “the social scientific 
interpretation of environmental reform processes at multiple scales in the contemporary world” 
(Mol, Spaargaren, and Sonnenfeld 2014:2). Following the similar logic as modernization theory 
that poverty and inequalities can be addressed through development, ecological modernization 
assumes that better environmental policies and regulatory mechanism can be developed to 
improve environmental quality with economic growth. New technologies, “greener” social 
values, advanced structure-design and industrial innovation by government and enterprises are 
believed to handle environmental degradation and “secure ecologically sustainable futures” 
(Pellow and Brehm 2013:232; Adua et al. 2019). Ecological modernization scholars propose 
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increases in energy and resource efficiency, new policies regarding environmental management 
and sustainable development, as well as technology innovation to promote clean energy and 
hazardous waste treatment to deal with pollution produced in capitalist industrial economy (Adua 
et al. 2019). Institutional environmental reform lies at the core of modernization theory to 
promote systematic transformation. As Mol et al. argued, political modernization aims to 
innovate state environmental policies to better integrate the biophysical environment to modern 
societies, as an important part of ecological modernization process (2014). Ecological 
modernization scholars assume rational human beings in the market and identify the crucial role 
played by economic and political actors in environmental policymaking (Mol et al. 2014). A 
systematic social change oriented to democracy is described as the reasonable solution for 
environmental problems.     
However, the ecological modernization approach overlooks the uncertainty in developing 
countries and radical political economy changes in the global system, as well as the risk of 
applying Western environmental state model to development states. Since the ecological 
modernization framework emphasizes the positive role played by institutional actors, political 
elites and corporations in addressing environmental problems in a democratic society, it is 
overoptimistic about the positive social change promoted through state-corporate collaboration 
and neglects the real political economic conditions in development states, especially countries 
controlled by authoritarian governments. Due to lack of the space for civil society, some 
authoritarian states fail to incorporate ecological demands from the grassroot. Instead of coming 
up with policies for ecological improvement, the “business-as-usual” collaboration between 
business and political leaders in the Third World prioritizes economic growth over 
environmental degradation, helping secure their dominant status in society, which further 
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generates power disparities, and hinders the process of addressing environmental problems 
(Bryant 1997).  
The ecological modernization approach proposes systematical change without 
restructuring the capitalist mode of production. The primary goal of enforcing new 
environmental regulation and resource management policies is creating sustainable development 
to perpetuate current capitalist system. The ecological modernization approach sees development 
and the “commercialization of more efficient technologies by making natural resources less 
expensive” as the universal way to improve ecological equity. Yet this may create more serious 
environmental destruction and harm to the unprivileged from the Global South (Bonds and 
Downey 2012:170). As Bonds and Downey argued, unequal ecological exchange and the 
extraction and exploitation of specific raw material and resource from the periphery and semi-
periphery countries construct the necessary foundation of “green technologies” development in 
the core nations (2012).  
The ecological modernization framework is utilized by China’s central government as the 
guideline to promote ecological civilization in the post-modernization era and is widely cited in 
China’s current environmental and rural tourism policies. China’s central government proposes 
green technology-intensive ecological civilization as the panacea to heal ecological crisis in 
mainland China and address pollution and environmental degradation resulting from rapid 
industrialization and urbanization. This thesis will discuss the strategies and key policies utilized 
by China’s central government to promote the construction of environmentally friendly society 
in China to facilitate the establishment and transformation of Zhoushan seafood industrial cluster 




China’s Modernization: Agricultural-Oriented Land Reform and Ecological Modernization   
Since the modernization approach advocates a Western single-direction pathway for 
development, which depends upon the primitive capital accumulation alongside colonization 
expansion in Western world, it is difficult for developing countries to duplicate this 
modernization within today’s global geopolitical and economic circumstances (Wen 2007). Yet 
China’s strategy has been reshaped by the central government responding to national conditions 
and political demands. China’s governmental-led effort adopted key elements from 
modernization theory, starting with the post-socialist reform since early 1980 (Looney 2015). 
PRC’s policy priority was shifted from the urban side to the rural side in its post-1978 socialist 
reform (Xue et al. 2021). For instance, PRC started to officially prioritize rural reform in its 
national development plan in the 1982 No.1 Central Document (Xue et al. 2021).   
Similar to Western modernization process, industrialization and urbanization are 
prioritized in China’s development strategy (Chen 1992). “Catch up with Western industrial 
civilization” is the primary goal of China’s modernization plan (Li and Barlow 2001:1274). 
Since the late 1980s, PRC adopted economic growth-oriented modernization development 
strategies to fuel industrialization and urbanization, which not only removed peasants from the 
agricultural sectors and directed rural labor to industrial and service sectors in cities, but also 
linked China’s national economy to the global market (Ye et al. 2017; Xue et al. 2021). China’s 
central government proposed to achieve a moderately prosperous society (‘xiao kang she hui’ in 
Chinese) by 2020 as part of its modernization plan, through increasing per capita GDP (Gross 
Domestic Product) up to USD $3,000 and promoting the level of urbanization to 55 percent 
(Wen 2007). China’s central government addressed the “Three Rural Issues” (rural people, 
agriculture and society) resulting from previous urban-rural development disparities in China’s 
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post-1978 socialist transformation, through promoting economic growth and urbanization, 
reducing income inequalities, and redistributing social resources from the urban to rural area 
(Yeh, O’Brien, and Ye 2013; Wen 2007; Xue et al. 2021).  
China’s rapid industrialization and urbanization are directly guided by government 
policy. China’s government strategy also involves agricultural transformation. Radical economic 
reform proposed by Deng Xiaoping (the second-generation leader of Communist Party of China) 
in the mid-late 20th century marked the end of central-planned economy and the start of China’s 
marketization (Huang 2015). A set of policies to promote economic growth, fuel rural 
transformation, improve rural infrastructure, and alleviate poverty were released since 1978 (Liu, 
Guo and Zhou 2018). In the late 1970s, the collective land management system was replaced by 
the Household Responsibility System (HRS), which was officially established in 1982, as an 
agricultural reform initiative to replace production teams with farming households as the unit of 
agricultural production to promote economy (Liu et al. 2018; Xue et al. 2021). Post-1978 pilot 
projects started from the east coast of China kicked off the marketization, price liberalization and 
major industrialization in modern China, which allow market-oriented economy to ground under 
state control. Newly built industrial clusters started to raise up near big cities, which fueled 
China’s modernization process.      
Contributing to long-standing historical and social problems, the development of China’s 
urban and rural areas is unbalanced. Governmental policies have prioritized industrial and urban 
development. Due to limited material and social resources, urban development is often based on 
sacrifices made by rural areas. Hukou – a household registration system was utilized by the state 
to restrict internal labor migration and resource allocation over past several decades (Andreas 
and Zhan 2016). Benefits associated with urban hukou allow city residents to enjoy exclusive 
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state service such as higher-paid jobs and better education, while rural hukou is often denied 
getting access to these social welfare services (Yeh et al. 2013; Andreas and Zhan 2016). In other 
words, urban hukou represents modernity while rural hukou is a symbol of underdeveloped. 
Since peasants are tied to farmland and they are not allowed to migrate for jobs before the 1980s, 
urban residents’ privilege can be maintained. A gap between urban and rural area is created and 
widened over time.  
With the rapid acceleration of urbanization and industrialization, an expanding labor 
force is needed in and around cities. Since the mid-1980s, rural labor started to migrate to non-
agricultural sectors in cities for employment, which was encouraged by China’s central 
government to promote modernization and alleviate rural poverty (Liu et al. 2018). As Yeh et al. 
claimed, “China’s rise has been fueled by more than 250 million migrant workers, members of 
the ‘floating population’, whose labor in export processing zones, cities and better-off villages 
has turned China into ‘the world’s factory’” (2013:916). This new labor relation brought 
challenges to both China’s cities and countryside. On the one hand, cities need to handle the 
pressure result from dramatical population increases and meet the growing population’s basic 
needs. On the other hand, since rural young adults migrate to cities and industrial clusters for 
employment, the elderly and children are often left behind without proper care due to social 
service gaps in the countryside (Ye 2011; Ye et al. 2017). The traditional rural society is slowly 
breaking down. China’s central government has started to pay attention and address these 
problems to fuel social stability and regime legitimacy (Huang 2015).   
New land reform policies have been proposed by China’s central government to facilitate 
rural transformation and agricultural modernization. Scale-up agriculture and agribusiness are 
now central to the government led rural poverty alleviation project, of which land concentration 
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and consolidation started to replace hukou-based land right with market-based land right under 
state regulation (Andreas and Zhan 2016). In the 2014 China’s No.1 Document, PRC issued new 
guidelines which redefined “collective land tenure” to three “interrelated but separable” rights of 
land govern ownership, contractual rights of land, and use rights of land (“san quan fen zhi” in 
Chinese) (Xue et al. 2021:274). Although land is still collectively owned by state instead of a 
tradable community (especially farm land), PRC’s new three land rights making land transfer 
and concentration possible for scale-up agricultural production and industrialization (Andreas 
and Zhan 2016). The new three land rights policy separated the operation right of land from the 
ownership and contractual rights of land: on the one hand, the operation right (use right) of land 
is transferrable, which allowing peasants using the farmland operation right to “finance 
mortgages from financial institutions”; on the other hand, the farmland contractual and 
ownership rights are not transferrable, which underpinning the collective ownership of rural land 
in China (Wang and Zhang 2017:112). As scholars claimed, the transfer of land management 
rights could improve land using efficiency to secure China’s agricultural product supplies, 
especially for the abandoned land (Zhou et al. 2018). Land compensation was employed by PRC 
to fuel land consolidation and reclamation to construct public infrastructures and improve social 
services (Zhou et al. 2018). As the consequence, peasants were separated from the farmland to 
fuel agricultural industrialization and scale-up agriculture. Small- to middle-size farms who 
cannot afford large amount land leasing are excluded from the market because they don’t have 
price advantage for their products, while large agribusiness companies with abundant capital 
who can afford large amount land leasing and cut cost through massive plantation are winning. 
In this process, peasants have increasingly lost their operation rights over farmland. Landless 
peasants fuel China’s industrialization and urbanization, they are doubly squeezed in this system: 
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they cannot integrate into cities due to policy restrictions yet they also cannot return to the rural 
area since they already lost their farmland (Ye 2015). This is the dilemma faced by tens of 
millions of migrant peasants and their families in modern China. 
While China’s industrialization and urbanization have depended upon the sacrifice of the 
rural areas, this state policy requires industries and the urban areas to “back-feed” and facilitate 
countryside development (Ye 2011). Throughout the 2000s, the goal of China’s shifting policy 
focus is to address mounting social and environmental crises in rural areas, as well as “improve 
rural public service and social welfare” (Xue et al. 2021:273). In 2005, China’s central 
government proposed “New Socialist Countryside Program” as part of its modernization 
development strategies to address residual rural labor, land erosion, environmental degradation, 
and urban-rural inequalities (Ye 2011; Beeson 2010; Xue et al. 2021). In the late 2000s, China’s 
central government started to encouraging private and state capital to enter the agricultural 
sectors to facilitate scale-up production and rural development (Xue et al. 2021). PRC 
recognized rural poverty as the most challenging social problem in contemporary China in 2012; 
it proposed “Precision Poverty Alleviation (PPA) and Rural Entrepreneurship initiatives” to 
address rural poverty (Xue et al. 2021:277).  
Rural Revitalization development strategy was raised by PRC in 2018 to promote rural 
entrepreneurship and create new productivity growth in the countryside, in responding to 
returning migrant workers from cities (Xue et al. 2021). Scale-up agriculture, rural industry and 
leisure rural tourism grounded in recent years. In China’s “explosive economic growth” and 
industrialization has had a “rapid growing ecological footprint”, which has been highly 
destructive to the natural environment and fueled climate change (Beeson 2010). As part of this 
re-orientation to the countryside, China’s central government has promoted a strategy of small-
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town sustainable tourism to better utilize and manage local natural resources, which can promote 
rural infrastructure construction and increase rural household income. Chinese scholars outline 
that tourism as a “development initiative” can help local communities build urbanized living 
environment and transform local socio-economic conditions (Qian, Feng, and Zhu 2012), in 
keeping with China’s urbanization plan.  
Additionally, since the mid-2000s, China’s central government proposed ecological 
civilization as a new template for sustainable development and environmental governance (Xue 
et al. 2021). Restoring the relationship between human, society and non-human nature lies at the 
center of ecological civilization. This policy mandatorily requires industries and business 
corporations to install waste treatment and pollution clean facilities to meet standards set by 
national department of environmental protection. Attributing to its authoritarian political 
arrangement, China is able to integrate technologies, national resources and corporations to 
address environmental problems efficiently for a short run, but lack of space for civil society 
often makes it difficult for China’s central government to incorporate the people’s real demands 
into national policies.  
Since studies on rural tourist development alongside the establishment of industrial 
cluster are limited, this thesis will help expand our understanding of this topic. Set within the 
context of China’s modernization project and its rural transformation strategy, this study intends 
to discuss the interconnected relations between the seafood industrial cluster and rural 











This research involves a case study in the Zhoushan Islands of China from 2019 to 2020 
using qualitative research methods. Data is collected through semi-structured and informal 
interviews, participant observation, ethnography, and library research on state policies. I visited 
two seafood processing zones at Zhoushan Islands, two rural villages next to the seafood 
industrial cluster, and I joined one seafood companies’ annual meeting to learn how the 
establishment of this industrial cluster fuels social changes in labor arrangements and rural 
community transformation. This research analyzes the implementation of China’s 
industrialization, modernization, and rural development policies since the post-1978s. I focus 
particularly on two policies intended to boost economic development and rural revitalization 
development at Zhoushan Islands, focusing on the construction of Pilot Free Trade Zone and 
Rural Tourism. It is appropriate to utilize the qualitative methodology to dig into collective 
community memories and map the social transformation because this thesis intends to study 
social changes resulting from the establishment of the seafood industrial cluster at Zhoushan 
Islands. This chapter discusses my research questions, research design, data collection, and data 
analysis in turn.  
  
Research Questions 
My primary research question is: alongside the implementation of state and local 
policies, how local labor arrangement and rural community be transformed over time with the 
establishment of seafood industrial cluster in Zhoushan Islands of China? Since I want to study 
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the process of changes over time, my research focuses on several sub-questions to better unpack 
this topic:  
1) How is national and local government policy facilitating the rise of seafood industrial 
cluster at Zhoushan Islands in China? 
2) How is the family-managed seafood processing factory zone being established over 
time at Zhoushan Islands? What are the major characteristics of seafood processing 
factories in this cluster?   
3) How do seafood processing factories attract on-site and off-site wage-laborer? What 
are the labor arrangement and migration pattern in this area? How is the power 
structure in this seafood industrial cluster looks like? 
4) How is fishing industrialization and the establishment of seafood processing 
reshaping rural residents’ livelihood and lifestyle over time?  
5) Why China’s central and local government propose rural tourism as the primary Rural 
Revitalization Development Strategy in this area? How is rural community being 
transformed with the implementation of such policies? Who benefit and who lose in 
this process?  
 
To answer the questions listed above, I must take specific historical, social, economic and 
political conditions in China into consideration. In the context of China, the authoritarian 
political system determines social change promoted through a top-to-down approach with 
government intervention. Therefore, significant social transformation in contemporary China is 
often directly guided by the central government’s choices. It is important to integrate the analysis 
of national and local level changes together to illustrate how rural communities are transformed 
with the rise of seafood industry cluster at Zhoushan Islands. An individual’s destiny in China is 
like a drop into the ocean, individuals are subject to policy shifts with limited capacity to pursue 







 This research utilizes a case study at Zhoushan Islands to illustrate rural community 
changes with the establishment of seafood industrial cluster. Case study research as a qualitative 
method has been acknowledged by scholars as “a basically sound approach” in social science 
research, which “bridge(s) the gap between the stereotyped, factual community survey, and the 
personality-culture community study” (Symonds 1945:352). By investigating typical cases with 
solid empirical evidence, researchers can discover and apply new rules to explain other cases in 
similar social settings. Since this study focuses on the dynamic processes of how rural 
communities are being reformed with the establishment of seafood processing at Zhoushan 
Islands, it is efficient to do a case study to frame the area’s general patterns of labor arrangement 
and rural transformation. The pattern I found in this study also could be applied to explain rural 
changes happened in other less developed areas of mainland China with the accelerated 
industrialization and urbanization in recent decades. As Symonds outlined, “the formulation of 
integrated concepts of human behavior from the analysis of case material” lies on the heart of 
case study research (1945:355). Due to China’s particular political, social and cultural contexts, 
researchers must take these circumstances into consideration to study social change. The 
formulation of integrated analysis in the case study method allows me to take historical, social, 
political and cultural processes and other contextual conditions into consideration. This study 
incorporates semi-structured and informal interviews, participant observation, ethnography and 
library research on state policies to study social changes resulting from fishing industrialization 
and urbanization at Zhoushan Islands, and to then pursue a discussion of the relationships among 





 I first visited Q Seafood Processing and Production Inc. and Gan Shiao village at 
Zhoushan Islands in the summer of 2019 with the introduction by the brother-in-law of my 
grandmother and my uncle-in-law. I developed my interest in industrial clusters and rural 
transformation from one of my graduate-level seminars focuses on development and 
globalization. After visiting Zhoushan Islands in 2019, I came up with the research topic for this 
thesis. I stayed at Zhoushan Islands from July 6 to July 14 in 2019. During this period of time, in 
order to select the case for this thesis, I explored the city of Zhoushan and nearby towns, 
including city museum, college town, Mount Putuo (one travel resort based on long-term local 
Buddhist tradition), rural BNBs (Bed and Breakfast), international aquatic wholesale market, 
seafood industrial cluster, rural and fishing villages, as well as fish pier and the model village for 
the government’s Beautiful Countryside project. After developed a detailed research plan, I 
revisited Zhoushan Islands in the winter of 2020. Introduced by my family members, I met 
owners and workers from seafood processing factories located in the seafood industrial cluster at 
Zhoushan Islands. I spent 11 days doing field work, conducting interviews, participant 
observation and ethnography at Zhoushan Islands in January of 2020.  
 
Position Reflection 
 In social science research, investigator’s personal identity and social position, such as 
gender, ethnicity, educational background and socio-economic status, etc. could affect how data 
is collected and interpreted (Dwyer and Buckle 2009). Being an insider qualitative researcher 
means the researcher may have the similar identities with the group he or she intends to study. 
Compared to outsider researchers who don’t have such membership status, it is easier for insider 
 
 32 
researchers to gain the access to a group and gather more open responses with greater depth from 
respondents (Dwyer and Buckle 2009). However, since insiders are familiar with norms, social 
expectations and behavior code in that group, they might interpret participant’s response in a 
“preset” way without noticing the familiar details which might not make sense to the outsider. 
Being an outsider researcher allows scholars to maintain researcher’s role when they enter into 
the field. Although it is not easy for outsiders to gain participant’s trust at the beginning, outsider 
researchers are relatively objective regarding to details that might be overlooked by insider 
researchers. Dwyer and Buckle argue that the insider and outsider status are relevant to each 
other because qualitative researchers may hold “dual roles” as both outsiders and insiders in 
different times (2009:58). The requirement for a qualitative researcher “to be open, authentic, 
honest, deeply interested in the experience of one’s research participants, and committed to 
accurately and adequately representing their experience” can be better achieved through bridging 
the insider and outsider roles in the field (Dwyer and Buckle 2009:59).       
Turning to the reflection of my personal identity and position, I am a 24-year-old, 
middle-class Chinese female graduate student who grew up in mainland China. Since I have the 
same cultural identity, speak mandarin and have the similar socialization background with 
people who live at Zhoushan Islands, I could be considered as an insider in this study. However, 
since I had no life experience at Zhoushan Islands prior to the first time I visited in 2019, and I 
can’t speak the dialect widely spoken in this place, I can be considered also an outsider. Hence, I 
consider myself as a qualitative researcher who hold “dual roles” as both insider and outsider. On 
the one hand, my Chinese ethnicity, Mandarin speaking and blood lineage allow me to present 
myself in the field as an insider – a Chinese graduate student who wants to study rural 
community transformation and local fishing industrialization history in my grandmother’s 
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hometown. On the other hand, my identity as a city girl who is studying abroad with a 
sociological background and lack of life experience at Zhoushan Islands make me as an outsider 
meanwhile.  
My “dual roles” allowed me to quickly get access to the industrial cluster and rural 
community I intended to study. I gained trust from my respondents and was able to interview 
local authorities and people in power, since I have the kinship-based social connections to key 
agencies (doorkeepers) from different social groups at Zhoushan Islands. However, I can’t speak 
the dialect widely spoken by local residents and I had to do my interview in Mandarin which 
might limit my respondent’s capacity to express themselves accurately. I had to rely on my 
translator when I interviewed someone who cannot speak Mandarin. Misunderstanding, 
misinterpretation and meaning loss might happen in this translating process.  
It is important to note that since I was introduced by people in power with higher social 
status into seafood factories and rural villages, it was easy for me to get in-depth responses from 
village authorities, factory owners and managers, dealers in fish pier and people who maintain 
close relationships with my introducers. However, my access to unprivileged respondents like 
migrant workers in the factory, ordinary residents in rural village, etc. was limited because I was 
watched by factory managers and was monitored by the people who are close to village 
authorities. Participants without close relationship to local authorities were afraid of being 
punished if they said something wrong in front of me. I did informal interviews with those 
people when I was alone and asked “non-sensitive” questions. Since I am a Chinese national who 
is familiar with the research area, I have the qualifications and preparation to carry out this study 





Semi-Structured Interview  
I conducted 12 in-depth formal interviews recorded in a 496 minutes tape, including three 
seafood processing factory owners at Zhoushan Islands, one product engineer at Q seafood 
processing and production Inc., one retired local government officer, one village committee, one 
fruit plantation owner and an agritainment business owner at Gan Shiao village, an aquatic dealer 
from the largest fish pier at Zhoushan Islands, the general manager of rural complex project next 
to Gan Shiao village, one rural Bed and Breakfast business owner, as well as a middle-aged 
female cleaner who working at a local hotel comes from nearby rural village. Interviews focus on 
personal livelihood changes in past decades with the rise of seafood processing in this area, 
respondent’s engagement in the seafood processing industry and rural tourism, how they 
witnessed and experienced policy shifts in terms of rural transformation, as well as current 
challenges and difficulties in their life. The length of interviews varied from forty-five minutes to 
one and a half hours. I interviewed some respondents twice or thrice to guarantee the accuracy 
and validity of my data. Participants were asked to verbally consent to participate in the research 
and informed regarding their right to quit at any time. All communication was in Mandarin. I did 
not use written consent forms, since some respondents may not have the literacy skills to 
understand such forms. I recorded interviews with no names or other identifying information to 
augment my field notes and enhance data quality; all research records instead were assigned ID 







 I conducted eight informal non-recorded interviews with three ordinary middle-aged 
residents at Gan Shiao village: one nearby female supermarket owner who migrated from outside 
province, the doorkeeper of one seafood processing factory, a migrant couple who working for a 
seafood processing factory, one owner of tuna processing factory, as well as a local college 
professor who collaborates with seafood processing companies for research and product 
development. Interviews are varied in length from twenty minutes to half an hour, depending on 
the specific situation and the distance from people who were monitoring me. I asked questions 
such as how participants got involved in seafood processing and rural tourism, how their 
personal livelihoods changed over time, what social changes they witnessed in recent years, their 
main income source and family structure, why they chose to migrate for jobs or education and 
why not. Since I did not record these informal interviews, I took field notes and wrote down as 
many details as possible immediately after chatting with my respondents. The resulting 
information can be used to verify the data collected from interviewing participants in power 
(such as factory owners, government authorities, etc.), as well as allow the voice from 
unprivileged groups to be included in my research.         
 
Sampling 
This research utilizes snowball sampling for semi-structured and informal interviews. I 
contacted people I know who live at Zhoushan Islands about my research in order to facilitate 
entre to the field. I sought their assistance in introducing me to seafood factory owners, local 
government officers, village authorities, local and migrant workers working in seafood industrial 
cluster, and residents from nearby rural villages. Then following a snowball sampling approach, I 
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asked respondents in turn to recommend other adult volunteers who might be interested in 
participating in this study. Utilizing these approaches, I can draft the social connections between 
respondents and conceptualize how rural communities, seafood processing zones and rural 
tourism link to and affect each other within the same political framework.   
 
Participant Observation 
 I conducted around 216 hours of participant observation and field work at Zhoushan 
Islands in China from 2019 to 2020. I immersed myself into seafood processing factories at 
Zhoushan Islands through participating into factory’s daily activities. I was permitted to follow 
and stay with the factory owner, observe seafood producing process, as well as freely walk in the 
factory. This allows me to document labor arrangements, operation structure and management 
hierarchy of the factory, interactions between workers and supervisors, working conditions, as 
well as basic living facilities for workers. I also drew the map of this industrial cluster when I 
walked around this district. I took detailed notes about traffic conditions, construction resources 
and the distance to nearby rural communities in this zone. This helps me gather information and 
explain why local government selected this place to build the seafood industrial cluster.  
 I attended one seafood factory annual meeting in January 2020 where I got the chance to 
chat with several migrant workers and the college professor who cooperated with the factory. I 
documented the seat arrangement in this event and the interactions between factory owners, 
middle managers, migrant workers, and other participants, which reflect the power structure and 
regulatory arrangements in this factory. As a relative to the factory owner, people in higher status 
and those with a good reputation were willing to talk to me. Some migrant workers were willing 
to openly share their stories with me, but our conversations were closely monitored by 
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supervisors who sat at the same table. Nothing negative about factory work, income and benefits 
can be mentioned in that situation, but I was able to document workers’ migration story and their 
rationality behind it. I also got the chance to chat with the college professor who introduced how 
his research team provides technical support and cooperate with the seafood factory. This allows 
me to draw the connection between academic institutions and factories, illustrating how social 
resources can be utilized to facilitate the development of this seafood industrial cluster.   
 
Ethnography 
 I visited Gan Shiao village and the seafood industry cluster at Zhoushan Islands several 
times to observe rural residents’ and factory workers’ daily activities and interactions with other 
people. It is rare to see young people in both locations. Elderly women make up the majority of 
the population who “stay at home” in this area. Gan Shiao village is one of the model villages for 
rural tourism. I walked around and documented its architectures, land use, farming land 
distribution, entertainment facilitates, family-owned Bed-and-Breakfast businesses and public 
space for villagers. I was able to chat with several residents about their livelihoods change, 
occupation and income, their family structure, their opinions on rural tourism project and nearby 
seafood processing zone. Through observing the interactions between ordinary rural residents 
and local authorities or people who are close to local authorities, I can draw a rough map of the 
power structure and regulatory pattern in this rural community. I was able to uncover inequalities 
and unequal resource allocation through observing the amount of assets and what kinds of house 
local residents own.  
 I also spent one day in the biggest fish pier next to the seafood processing zone at 
Zhoushan Islands. I documented interactions between fishers, raw seafood dealers, hourly 
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workers, factory buyers and individual consumers. I took detailed notes on the physical 
arrangement of trading sections for different seafood products in this pier, people’s activities, 
dealer’s selling strategies, as well as hourly workers’ division of labor and gendered working 
patterns in this place. This information allows me to draw the whole picture of the seafood 
processing and production chain at Zhoushan Islands, as well as to illustrate how capital and 
resources are mobilized within the interwoven but relative closed social networks based on 
familiar social connections.    
 
Library Research: State Policies 
 Secondary data from annual government yearbooks, local chronicles, policies published 
by China’s central government and local authorities from 1978 to 2013 is included to construct 
the background for this study. I documented chronologically key events related to aquatic 
product processing and trading, as well as policies for industrial cluster establishment and rural 
reformation at Zhoushan Islands since the late 1970s. Then I create a table to make connections 
between 1) guidance and opinion published by central government and corresponding local 
policies; 2) policy implementation and outcomes on record; and 3) policy shifts and rural 
changes with the rise of Zhoushan seafood industrial cluster. This approach allows me to 
illustrate the top-to-down shifting policy process and its influence on local policy arrangements, 
which provides me a concrete political and historical background to discuss social changes in 







My coding scheme is based on Max Weber’s conceptualization of ideal types. As Weber 
argues, an ideal type is a distilled concept and framework from empirical reality which reflects 
the generalized pattern of meaning from a comparison of reality, but would never capture the 
true essence of the real world (Swedberg 2018:184 & 190). One basic logic of inclusive research 
is that scholars may comprehend theories through generalizing empirical reality observed from 
grounded studies. Utilizing ideal types can help sociological researchers capture the rough sketch 
of the empirical world. They are also an efficient way to approach new topics and discover new 
rules in the social world (Segady 2014; Swedberg 2018). Since my dataset is largely first-hand 
data, I use ideal types to do data coding and analyzing. With this approach, patterned changes 
over time can be better illustrated.   
As noted above, I conducted: 12 formal in-depth interviews and 8 informal interviews 
with 496 minutes interview recording and 216-hour on-site participant observation and 
ethnography at Zhoushan Islands, China from 2019 to 2020. Since the interviews were 
conducted in Mandarin, my primary coding scheme is designed in Mandarin to maximize the 
capture of key meanings. Turning to my first-round coding, I listened and transcribed key 
paragraphs from interviews in Mandarin, identifying major concepts repeated over time, and 
drafting a timeline of when the transformation happened. I translated these materials into 
English. The codes I identified and utilized for data analyzing in the first round included: 
governmentality, key point-in-time of industrial cluster establishment, labor migration, 
supervision/control in factory, international trading, rural livelihoods change, occupation and 
income, policy implementation/achievement, and rural tourism. These codes are helpful for me 
 
 40 
to screenshot major changes over time, draft the timeline of changes and spotlight key personal 
livelihood transitions.  
My second-round coding categorized key information into three major topics: seafood 
industrial cluster, rural community transformation and policy influence. Within the area of 
seafood industrial cluster, sub-categories included familiar social connection, governmentality, 
surveillance, labor hierarchy with the clarification on local residency, educational background 
and gender. The area of rural community transformation, includes surveillance, BNBs, income 
inequality and social stratification. In the area of policy influence, three sub-categories are 
outlined as fishing industrialization, urbanization and rural tourism. These coding schemes 
enable me to categorize key information and meanings to frame my analysis of the rise of 
seafood industrial cluster and rural community transformation respectively.              
 Through reviewing annual government yearbooks and local chronicles, I tabulated 
policies published by China’s central government and local authorities as well as corresponding 
implementations in the past three decades. The codes I utilized for data analysis: economic 
development policy, rural revitalization, policy implementation/achievement and key point-in-
time of industrial cluster establishment. I selected two codes from my previous coding scheme 
for interviews in order to make connections and comparisons between my primary data and 
secondary data. Through matching and comparing the timeline of respondent’s personal 
experience and official recorded events, I can conceptualize how the implementation of policies 
transformed local resident’s livelihoods, social structure arrangements and other aspects of rural 
community in Zhoushan Islands of China. The similarities, disconnections and differences 
between official publications and respondent’s interviews will be highlighted in order to 




 This chapter discusses this thesis’s purpose and topic, my research design, data 
collection, coding scheme, and data analysis. Additionally, I want to highlight one thing in this 
conclusion. As a researcher in the field, when I was conducting interviews with migrant workers 
in seafood factories and ordinary residents at rural villages, I was often followed by factory 
supervisors or village authorities’ acquaintances: what we said, how I interacted with my 
respondents, and how they responded to my questions were closely watched by people who are 
close to the authority. This type of surveillance on me (my body and activities) is similar to how 
the factory and village authority surveil workers and ordinary villagers. In that way, factory 
owners and village authorities can secure absolute control over everything and everybody. My 
role as a researcher who has connections to the world out of these authority figures’ control 
might threaten their dominant position in factories or villages. For instance, incognito journalists 
went to this area before to investigate pollution resulting from seafood processing and expose it 
to the public. Many family-based seafood workshops were mandatorily shut down as a result, 
and the government issued large fines as the official response to public trust crisis. Therefore, as 
an outsider and a researcher interested in inequalities and stratification in seafood factories and 
rural villages, local authorities, migrant workers, and villagers cannot fully understand my role as 
a sociological investigator. They often misunderstand my position as an incognito journalist who 
intends to disclose the disgraceful aspect of the seafood industry and rural communities. The 
surveillance on me and my interaction with my respondents is a “self-protective” strategy 
utilized by factory owners and village authorities to maintain their dominant status and secure the 
exclusive benefits of perpetuating inequalities. A detailed discussion of surveillance will be 
unpacked in the following chapters.                         
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 The unique geographical, historical, political and cultural conditions at Zhoushan Islands 
generate this seafood industrial cluster’s success. To discuss the ongoing rise of the seafood 
processing zone at Zhoushan Islands, this chapter starts by comprehensively reviewing local 
geography, natural resources and historical, political and cultural forces shaping the seafood 
industrial cluster’s foundation. Following this, I will take a snapshot to show the whole aquatic 
economy at Zhoushan Islands. I then introduce Zhoushan International Aquatic Product City, a 
government-funded seafood wholesale market at the center of the Zhoushan free trade pilot zone, 
which connects and coordinates different sectors related to the seafood industrial cluster, as well 
as facilitates capital and resource mobilization in local seafood industrial cluster. After reviewing 
key state policies facilitating seafood trading and economic upgrading at Zhoushan Islands since 
1980, I will discuss local seafood factories’ development as family-managed and familiar social 
network-based enterprises, which utilize social capital to mobilize scarce social resources to 
survive from fierce market competition under PRC’s development strategy.  
 
The Rise of the Seafood Factories 
 
Walking along the clean street with orderly aligned cement modern architectures and 
evergreen camphor trees, the city of Zhoushan Islands looks no different from other eastern cities 
of China. Fresh, moist ocean breeze creates a salty taste which mixes with the smell of grilled 
seafood, setting the theme that dominates the summer night in this city. My guide Henry 
(anonymous name), a late middle-aged Chinese man who owns a marine product factory and has 
spent two-thirds of his life at Zhoushan Islands notes:  
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“You cannot imagine how muddy the road was in rainy season thirty years ago, the 
island was isolated from the mainland, manual ferry boat and motor sailor were the only 
transportation you could choose to go to Ningbo city (a second-tier city next to Zhoushan 
Islands) for supplements refilling, but now we have cross-sea bridges connecting islands 
and the mainland…the change is earth-shaking.”  
 
The neon signs flashed on the top of corner stores intertwined with bright streetlamps 
lighting up the whole city from the darkness. This modern, prosperous street view is proudly 
presented by the local government and community dwellers as a sign of the economic take-off in 
the past three decades. Twenty-minute drive from the central downtown, several marine-related 
factories quietly standing in the dark, blending into the background without being noticed by 
visitors. Nothing appears to be wrong with this harmonious city scene, yet there is a carefully 
muted underside to local life - the everyday struggles faced by the vast majority of ordinary 
citizens.          
Zhoushan Islands, located at the furthest east coast of China and representing the only 
maritime strategic area facing the Pacific Ocean, plays an important role of connecting the East 
China Sea and the Yangtze Valley, as well as facilitating the marine shipping network among 
Asia-Pacific countries (Cited from field notes). As the largest archipelago of China, Zhoushan 
Islands comprise 1390 islands and cover a total land area of 529.35 square miles, including one 
main island of 183.85 square miles where the Zhoushan Municipal Government is located (Cited 
from field notes).  
Rapid industrialization, modernization and urbanization policies advocated by the central 
government of People’s Republic of China (PRC) have since the late 1980s encouraged money-
oriented society and prioritized economic growth above everything in the name of development. 
In response to the growth of global trade network and intensified international interconnections, 
China (Zhejiang) Pilot Free Trade Zone was established at Zhoushan Islands in 2017. This Pilot 
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Free Trade Zone was carefully designed by the central government as a strategic plan to support 
international shipping and trading, to connect mainland China to the rest of the world. However, 
this industrial cluster was not created overnight, its record can be tracked back to China’s 
marketization in the early 1980s. In other words, the Zhejiang Pilot Free Trade Zone project is 
built upon a naturally formed factory cluster and the long-standing local living patterns of 
Zhoushan Islands communities.  
 
 
FIGURE 1: The Map of Zhoushan Archipelago in China (Yue et al. 2017:46) 
 
 
The Zhoushan Municipal Government has used tax reduction and exemption policies to 
attract internal and external investments to fund the local seafood processing industry and tourist 
development projects. In the industry cluster, biweekly paid factory jobs have been created 
which are filled largely by workers who migrate from Yunnan province, Sichuan province, 
Anhui province and other less developed inland area of China. Ironically, hardly any local 
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Zhoushan Islands youth can be seen working in local factories as general workers. Instead, they 
have flooded into nearby first-tier cities like Shanghai and Hangzhou to pursue their studies or 
better paid jobs, and most of them never come back. A retired government officer jokes,  
“We are a city of migration, we are short in labor in recent years, migrant workers are 
not satisfied with factory salary, so the local government encourages factory owners 
either shift to highly mechanized production and join the official economic upgrading 
plan, or provide more benefits to workers by themselves to address labor shortage.”  
     
Living off the land and fishery have a long history at Zhoushan Islands, with the earliest 
records tracking these activities back more than 5,000 years ago. Zhoushan archipelago began its 
incorporation into China’s national administrative bureaucracy in the 1950s, with the PRC’s 
central government formally recognizing the municipal administration as the City of Zhoushan in 
the 1987s (Zhoushan Chorography 1992). Since this area is characterized largely by hills along 
the coastline, there is limited arable land and poor irrigation facilities. Cultivated land per capita 
is less than 0.033 acre (cited from field notes). Since the local residents have not been able to 
make a living by farming only, fishing and selling aquatic products has grown to become the 
major source of household income. Even during the period of central planned economy, before 
China’s marketization reform, private unlicensed seafood trading has been prevalent at the 
Zhoushan Islands. Private seafood trading takes place between the islands and nearby mainland 
cities. In the past, this economic activity has been stigmatized as “speculation and profiteering” 
(‘tou ji dao ba’ in Chinese) by the PRC and often had severe legal consequences. However, since 
Zhoushan Archipelago is isolated from the mainland by the lack of basic transport facilities, over 
the past thirty years a relative open governmental style has developed with loose regulations 




Wanger (anonymous name), a senior Chinese man who runs the largest squid processing 
factory at Zhanmao Town (one of the most successful seafood processing zones of Zhoushan 
Industrial cluster) in northeastern Zhoushan Islands, is honored as a legend for creating the most 
successful family-managed business starting from scratch. Until the last time we met, 
encouraged by local government, Wanger was busy with moving and preparing a bigger squid 
processing factory to a new government-planned seafood processing zone at northern Zhanmao 
Town. Wanger’s factory primarily produces seafood snacks. His products are often unbranded: 
the outer packing is changed to meet the requests of wholesalers and marine food companies 
who send orders from inland China. Wanger benefits from being near the seashore since he can 
always order the freshest seafood raw material directly from commercial fishing vessels. Since 
Wanger has maintained good personal relationships with seafood dealers and captains for 
decades, even during the fishing moratorium period from May to late August, his factory still can 
get fresh and high-quality seafood to keep up production.  
Wanger started his business in the early 1980s when he was still a jobless peasant at 
Zhanmao Town. Since farming cannot feed the family, Wanger’s father decided to send him to 
learn carpentry and became a shipwright. Wanger got to know sailors and crew members at 
work. As Wanger explains in his well-finished office: 
“They (the sailors mariner) know I came from the rural area and my family has 
farmland, we trust each other at work, so they would be willing to exchange homemade 
fresh vegetables and rice from me with fresh seafood… at that time, they (the sailors) 
usually out at sea for weeks without any replenishment, finally I became the only source 
of fresh local produce to most sailors…I earned my first pot of gold and started my 
business from there.”  
 
Led by Wanger, residents at Zhanmao Town started to run family-owned businesses 
processing squid and selling dried squid to the mainland. Processing raw squid requires a large 
amount of fresh water and local residents often use river water to clean raw squids. The squids 
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are then directly dry under the sun. This processing has caused severe water and farmland 
pollution around the local village. As Wanger recalls, 
“There was a bad smell befouls the atmosphere, you could smell it from a long distance 
hence the local government decided to designate a special area in the early 1990s for 
squid processing, they urged all businesses move into the new processing cluster.”  
 
Since the establishment of the industrial cluster in this designated place, factory owners 
who couldn’t run the business well or lack the necessary social connections with important 
agencies (such as seafood dealers, government officers and potential buyers) are excluded from 
the market. Only a few family-managed factories survived up to the present. Those who went 
bankrupt, have either moved away for other jobs, or work as managers and supervisors in 
acquaintance’s factories. Social stratification happened in this area with the enlarged income gap 
between local residents. 
 
 
Zhoushan International Aquatic Product City  
 Zhoushan International Aquatic Product City locates at Shenjiamen (SJM) harbor of 
Zhoushan Islands, which is a government-planned professional wholesale market for live, fresh, 
frozen and dried aquatic products. It is a state-owned strategic enterprise built on a previous local 
aquatic product market. Since the 1989s, this aquatic product wholesale market has pursued 
fishing industrialization development in line with PRC’s agricultural industrialization plan. It 
quickly becomes one of the leading agricultural enterprises in mainland China being directly 
supervised by China’s Ministry of Agriculture. As Figure 2 displays, Zhoushan International 
Aquatic Product City lies at the center of the seafood trading network and connects and 
coordinates with seven different sectors covering aquatic product production, supply, storage and 
sale. The Zhoushan international aquatic wholesale market channels information exchanges and 
the circulation of capital, labor and resources in the local industrial cluster, it also integrates 
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fishing, tourist and manufacturing sectors and links the local economy to domestic and oversea 
markets. 
 
FIGURE 2: Management Mode of Zhoushan International Aquatic Product City 
 
 
Using Zhoushan international aquatic wholesale market as their trading platform, local 
seafood factories and commercial fishing vessels are able to focus on expanding production and 
disregard marketing and drawing in customers. Although this seafood wholesale market is 
largely funded by private investors under fishing industrialization governmental policies, it is 
directly regulated and monitored by PRC’s officials and incorporated into the government 
economic development plan. Seafood manufacturing enterprises and self-employed aquatic 
product dealers can lease shops at Zhoushan International Aquatic Product City and sell products 
to domestic and foreign customers. Seafood shops in this market set up a display window for 































preferred products, then send orders directly to local manufacturers. This modern seafood 
wholesale market makes domestic and international aquatic product trading easier and cost-
efficient. This wholesale market is also a Zhoushan Islands landmark, visited by every 
commercial tour group. Visitors can purchase seafood product in bulk and souvenirs in this 
market; local residents also come to this place shopping for fresh seafood. By concentrating and 
integrating resources, the local government is able to attract private investors to fund its 
economic upgrading plan and establish a platform for international seafood trading. In other 
words, the aquatic product wholesale market integrates individual and commercial manufactures, 
economic and financing resource, tourism, workers and consumers together to promote fishing 
industrialization and modernization at Zhoushan Islands.  
 
Zhoushan Seafood Enterprises: State and Family-Owned Factories   
 There are two types of aquatic business at Zhoushan Islands: state-owned enterprises and 
family-operated factories. I explain first the organization of state-owned fishing and aquatic 
trading companies. The China Aquatic Products Zhoushan Marine Fisheries Corporation was 
established in 1962 to facilitate the centrally planned economy and ensure seafood supplies for 
the domestic market. The scope of services provided by this state-funded corporation include: 
pelagic fishery, aquatic product processing and trading, harbor logistics and industrial fishing 
services. Collective commercial fishing cartels (‘yu gong shang’ in Chinese) with central-
planned strategies were established in 1979, right before the early 1980s’ implementation of 
household contract responsibility system in rural China, to integrate individual village-based 
production teams and coordinate fishing production, transportation and commodity sale. These 
fishing cartels paved the road for fishing industrialization and modernization at Zhoushan 
Islands. Another state-owned fishing company, Zhoushan 2nd Marine Fisheries Corporation, was 
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established the same year for the similar purpose. In the 1985s, China’s central government 
repealed centrally planned seafood sale and distribution policies, relaxed price control and 
allowed market regulation of fishing industry. Collective commercial fishing cartels were 
replaced by collective fishing companies, which adopted modern enterprise management and 
separated enterprises from government administration. In this era, instead of being solely funded 
by the state, joint venture and shareholding systems were established in fishing industry. China’s 
central government and the local government established a series of policies to attract private and 
foreign investments to facilitate fishing industrialization and modernization in Zhoushan Islands 
of China.   
 The second and most common form of aquatic business at Zhoushan Islands are family-
operated factories. Most seafood processing factories in this industrial cluster are directly owned 
and operated by families or kinship-based clans. At the time of my field research, only one joint-
stock aquatic product company in this seafood industrial cluster had out-of-town shareholders.   
Wanger started his business in 1983, two years before China’s central government 
relaxed state control of seafood market. As Wanger explains: 
“At that time (early 1980s), self-selling seafood product was prohibited by the 
government, what we (small aquatic traders) did was run our business at midnight when 
official regulators fell asleep. Since most aquatic transactions happened at the SJM 
harbor, in early 1990s, this port terminal was designated by the municipal government as 
the biggest market for domestic and international aquatic trading in the east coast of 
China.”  
 
Private seafood trading was illegal at that time because all aquatic products were defined 
as common goods and there was no private property. The PRC centrally planned and collectively 
controlled fishing, marine product production, transportation and sales. Property, land and means 
of production like fishing boats were collective owned by official production teams. The fishery 
harvest was centrally planned and distributed to all the members in that community. Village 
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production teams specialized in different areas (farming, fishing, etc.). Production team members 
were paid by government issued coupons. These coupons could be exchanged for scarce food, 
cloth and other daily necessities.  
Fishing production team members would in this era often take (“steal”) the communally 
owned seafood and fish products they harvested to exchange for necessary goods like rice, fresh 
vegetables from local peasants. Wanger describes how this worked:  
“In the 1982-1983s, one catty (around 1.1 pounds) of rice cost fifty cents (RMB: yuan) 
and one catty of hairtail cost one yuan. We didn’t use cash in transaction, I sold rice to 
sailors and they used fresh hairtail to exchange rice from me, then I could resell the 
hairtail and make fifty cents per catty. Since this kind of business was illegal, nearly all 
transactions would happen between people we knew.” 
 
After his initial success, Wanger started to produce dried squid to sell to inland cities 
because offshore wild squid was abundant at that time. Dried squid still represents a major 
proportion of Wanger’s business today. Without advanced food drying machine and preservation 
technology, Wanger and his wife invest huge amounts of manual labor to clean, sort, and dry the 
squids (see Figure 3). In the late 1980s, Wanger rented farmland from nearby neighbors to 
expand production, Wanger’s squid processing factory began to take shape. Until 1997, Wanger 
hired neighbors to produce dried squids. Then to expand production, Wanger started to recruit 
migrant workers.   
              
FIGURE 3: Dried Squid Production Process in Wanger’s Factory 
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Since dried squid was very profitable and there were many opportunities to enter the 
seafood market in inland China, Wanger’s neighbors started to run their own dried squid 
businesses. Prior to 1997, there were 108 households at Zhanmao Town with dried squid 
business. However, water and farmland pollution quickly became a big concern, because family-
operated workshops utilize primitive methods to produce dried squids using river water to clean 
raw squids. Wanger explains how the local government responded to the rising pollution.  
“Government officials don’t want to interrupt our business because it contributes a lot to 
local economy, but they have to handle environmental pollution, they set up policies and 
urge us (household seafood workshops) to move to designated industrial cluster.”  
 
The first industrial cluster was established in 1997 at Zhanmao Town to better regulate 
pollution and promote the dried squid industry. Local finance institutions, like farmers and 
merchant banks, responded to this government development plan by providing loans to seafood 
factory owners. Since there is no private property in China, factory owners have to rent land 
from the government and invest in building factories by themselves. They usually have nothing 
to mortgage for loans. Instead, a compulsory and collective pledge system is mandatorily 
enforced in these loans. Local banks require two or three factory owners to provide a joint 
guarantee for loans. If one factory fails to pay back a loan, the other factories must repay the loan 
with fixed interest rate. Not all family-managed squid workshops survived these early years and 
only 10 squid factories are still open today in this seafood processing zone.  
Although China’s central government relaxed state control over seafood price in 1985, 
there is no complete template for market regulation. As Wanger and Henry recalled, the 
government only adjusted and controlled the price of staple food like rice and wheat. There was 
no official seafood price, no government set highest and lowest price. Factories that can provide 
products with high quality at lower price are winners in the price battle. Severe price competition 
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happens between family-based factories and state-owned seafood corporations, and many small 
business owners were excluded from the market.  
Most family-managed factories are living paycheck to paycheck and do not have the 
savings and circulating capital to manage a price drop. But state-owned seafood corporations can 
afford dramatic seafood price drop because the state will bear the loss. Wanger explains the 1998 
price drop. The price for dried shredded squid was 58 RMB/kilo sold by state-owned companies 
and 56-57 RMB/kilo for family-operated factories. Then to compete with small seafood 
factories, state-owned companies dropped their price 10 RMB/kilo overnight. Their shredded 
squid price stabilized at around 20 RMB/kilo. As a result, small family-owned seafood factories 
suffered great losses and many of them closed down. Wanger lost a million RMB in this price 
battle.  
 
Family-Owned Seafood Enterprise Social Networks 
Familiar social networks underpin the resource, capital and information circulation in this 
seafood industrial cluster. Family-managed seafood workshop owners who cannot maintain good 
relations with government officials, commercial vessel owners and other wholesale dealers are 
often excluded from the market. Enterprises which lack these networks cannot get fresh raw 
material, first-hand information and necessary protection from the authorities. Small household 
seafood workshops are also unable to survive and recover from natural disasters like hurricanes. 
Given their vulnerability, small enterprises are often forced to go out of business. Some family-
based squid factory owners have merged into joint corporations to manage unpredictable risks 
and maintain competitiveness in the market. This type of consolidation often happens between 
family members or friends to maintain family control of the company.  
 
 54 
Since 2006, the local government has encouraged this type of corporate amalgamation in 
order to facilitate environmental protection and reduce environmental treatment cost and to 
attract investment in automation in seafood processing industry. Fines for companies who fail to 
conduct proper environmental treatment are skyscraping. Yet small seafood factories often 
cannot afford waste treatment facilities. Many small factories are forced to merge with others to 
meet the environmental protection requirements enforced by the PRC. Limited government 
funding for industrial transition is available, according to Wanger. Factory owners must take 
responsibilities for their own business and meet government requirements, otherwise, they are 
not allowed to continue production.  
Systems of patronage, a primary feature of feudal society deeply rooted in China’s 
patriarchal system, are still alive today and are important in organizing seafood industry social 
networks. Scarce economic and social resources as well as risks are distributed along the 
intertwined social connections among elites with different backgrounds. Factory owners weave 
their own social networks to grant easy, exclusive access to needed resources for their businesses 
and avoid potential risks by collecting useful information in a timely manner. These factory 
owners maintain good relationships with officials, business partners and headmen from all walks 
of life. Although China has strengthened its legal system, some government officials put 
themselves above the law and exercise power beyond legal boundaries, especially in legal grey 
zones which have not been well captured and defined. In extreme cases, factory owners can 
utilize available social connections to seek protection from officials seeking to exert such 
authority and reduce or even eliminate legal punishments.  
As will be described in next section, Henry invites officials, cooperative partners and 
other stakeholders to join the end-of-year party to strengthen his social connections. This is a 
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common strategy utilized by factory owners. Factory owners also send expensive gifts to 
officials and key stakeholders during festivals to maintain good social relations. Although 
bribery is strictly prohibited by China’s central government, factory owners and officials 
maintain more subtle, private forms of resource exchange.  
The dominance of extended family and clans at Zhoushan Islands are important in 
shaping seafood industry social networks. In the extended family I followed, members come 
from all walks of life across the marine industry, government, legal system, tourism, and 
agriculture. Within the kindred-based clique, information and scarce social resource can be 
mobilized quickly. Loyalty to the family and family honor are essential moral values for local 
residents at Zhoushan Islands, family members share non-public information which is used to 
economic advantage is commonly acceptable. Such behavior is often free from punishment 
because it is difficult to define a disciplinary offence in this circumstance, especially within 
families. As a result, the extended family and clans are able to accumulate scarce social, political 
and economic resources from generation to generation. Even though there is no “private 
property” in China, families can accumulate considerable wealth by turning social connections 
into cash and exclusive social benefits. While seafood factory owners can use these local familial 
social networks to foster their success, migrant workers without powerful local family 
connections or capital have a very different life.  
 
Seafood Factory Relations Outside the Factory 
Henry’s factory is located in the old industrial cluster at Putuo district of Zhoushan 
Islands, it is right next to the major highway which connects Hangzhou city (new first-tier city) 
and Zhoushan Islands. Henry runs a business of exporting marine health care products – edible 
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peptide to Japan, Singapore and some European countries. Henry is one of the first people who 
went into business after China’s marketization reform since 1978. He used to work as a trade 
commissioner in a state-owned marine trading company. After accumulating his own social 
connections for years, Henry decided in the 1980s to run his own business. Unlike Wanger and 
David who don’t have higher educations, Henry holds a bachelor’s degree, which is quite rare. 
Henry started with selling frozen seafood to inland China in 1983 and got to know a Japanese 
businessman who was seeking for cooperation in China. Henry designed his product introduction 
and sent it to potential buyers in Japan via fax, by dialing the numbers listed on the Yellow Pages 
the Japanese businessman left with him.  
Henry’s marine health care product is valued by the local government and is being 
incorporated into the official economic upgrading plan. He received a subsidy from the 
government for updating production lines and manufacture equipment. Since Henry’s factory is 
highly mechanized, few workers are needed to operate production. His factory represents the 
new direction of economic upgrading the local government intends to implement at Zhoushan 
Islands in the next few decades.   
On the opposite side of the road from Henry’s factory, there is a housing district for 
migrant workers. Unlike the colorful painted factory buildings, this neighborhood is deep gray – 
the grounding color of cement. This district is close to the old industrial cluster and migrant 
workers often rent rooms from local house owners to save transport expenses. From here they are 
close to multiple employers. As Henry explains,  
“The workers always want higher wage, they are good at playing the game, they know 
we need labor, so they would ask the hourly wage from one factory and report the 




A week before Chinese Lunar New Year, migrant workers started to draw their salaries 
and return home. Few of them who decided to stay at Zhoushan Islands were invited to join the 
annual dinner planned by Henry and his family to celebrate the new year. Henry reserved the 
largest banquet hall at a good local seafood restaurant. It is traditional for factory owners to 
reward employees and strengthen their social relations with key economic, academic and 
political elites through partying. A few government officers who are in charge of tax, trade and 
export were invited, but many of them refused to show up since this type of gathering is 
prohibited by PRC’s central government as a form of corruption. Guests dressed up and sat by 
seven round tables. Guests’ seats were carefully arranged according to their social status and 
personal relationship with Henry and his family. The most distinguished position was reserved 
for business owners and government officers. Factory workers, taskmasters and supervisors were 
arranged to sit in the corner.  
Professor Lin and his graduate students from a nearby college were also invited to this 
New Year event, because they comprise the external food research and development team for 
Henry’s factory. Henry has been cooperated with Lin’s team for years. This factory-college 
collaboration is neither funded by the government nor the college but is a private connection 
between Professor Lin and Henry. Henry pays for Lin’s research project and the output are 
owned by Henry. Lin leads several ocean research programs funded by his college and local 
government, he also owns a scientific and technical company focuses on food preservation and 
seafood selling. Since Lin’s team utilizes funds from multiple places to study fresh seafood 
preservation technology and marine health care products, his research aligned perfectly with 
Henry’s business goal. At the New Year’s dinner this middle-aged Chinese man dressed in 
designer brands from head to foot, raises a glass of red wine to greet his students.  
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“My graduate students are principal researchers in this team, most of them are in their 
second or third year of study, of course I will pay them… some of them have committed to 
work in my company when they graduate,” says Professor Lin.  
 
At the New Year’s party, boxes of luxury Lafite and Maotai, famous French red wine and 
the top-grade Chinese liquor were served to Henry’s guests. One of Lin’s graduate students 
sophisticatedly toasted Henry and the other guests one by one, but ignored the factory workers 
says: “The most important lesson you need to know before entering the society is learning how to 
drink.”  
Unlike the lively and noisy party at Henry’s side, factory workers in the corner were 
silent. The workers hardly talk to each other and just ate. A male worker in his thirty’s who 
migrated from Henan province with his wife and baby girl explained his situation this way,  
“You know, our biggest dream is buying our own apartment in this city, we can make 
more money here and provide my daughter a better life, that’s why we decide to not go 
back,” reflecting on this male worker’s imagination on the bright future, his wife nodded 
to me and quickly looked down, “he is always right.”    
 
It is not very cold at Zhoushan Islands in January, Magnolia trees along the street are 
ready to bloom to celebrate the new year and the new cycle of seasons. Henry’s wife, a senior 
elegant Chinese woman who is a Catholic smiled to me, and said: “Everything is turning better, 
isn’t it? The Lord will bless us, there is always hope.”  
Hope for a better life and good fortune is shared by all the people at Zhoushan Islands 
regardless of their social status, but invisible structural forces push individuals with different 
backgrounds, particularly managers and workers, to different destinies.         
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter reviews geographical, cultural, historical, social contexts and key state 
policies facilitating seafood industrial clusters’ success at Zhoushan Islands. As part of China’s 
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modernization plan, seafood factories at Zhoushan Islands concentrate in government-designated 
areas with policies prioritizing factory development and factory-oriented economic resource 
flow; this makes Zhoushan seafood processing zone fulfill the definition of industrial clusters 
stated in previous studies. With the emphasis on structural facets, this chapter introduces the 
local aquatic economy and its trading network with a detailed discussion of Zhoushan 
International Aquatic Product City, the ongoing rise of seafood processing factories in this 
industrial cluster, and the characters of local business mode as family-operated seafood industry 
based on factory owner’s social networks. In addition to this discussion, I want to highlight how 
the case of Zhoushan industrial cluster echoes back to, and being distinctive from earlier 
researches on industrial clusters. Then I want to bring in new perspectives to this research agenda 
considering China’s political economy and modernization processes, to analyze how inequalities 
are being produced and amplified through the intertwined elite social relations at Zhoushan 
Islands.   
 Firstly, similar to scholars stated in previous research of industrial cluster, with the 
modernization initiative, China’s government plays a facilitative role in directing and 
manipulating economic resource flows to particular enterprises in Zhoushan industrial cluster - to 
efficiently promote local fishing industrialization and economic development. Distinctively, 
China’s political system’s authoritarian nature determines that all social change and economic 
transformation must be operated under the PRC’s supervision. In other words, any personal 
behaviors or corporate activities cannot cross the “red line” defined by the central government. 
However, China’s centralized political and legal system cannot exhaustively state all social 
behaviors in its legal items. This bureaucratic design cannot immediately capture, respond to and 
regulate new changes emerging in society. Although China can create top-down transformation 
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and integrate resources efficiently for national development, it cannot consistently achieve what 
the central government anticipated at the local level because of its complex and even conflicting 
bureaucratic arrangements. One complexity in China’s political economy is the grey zone 
between what is allowed and what is prohibited by laws. In the grey zone, familiar social 
relations can play an essential role in redirecting scarce resource allocation, information 
exchange, and wealth concentration to the elites.  
Like McNally’s discussion on guanxi as the informal business social connection and 
reciprocal personal relationships (2012), at Zhoushan Islands, family-managed seafood factory 
owners rely on social networks to direct advantaged resources to their factories, like Wanger and 
Henry. Those who survived severe market competition often maintain strong social ties with key 
agencies across the seafood industry (like government officials, other people in business, seafood 
dealers, etc.). In other words, equal market competition is ideally exists in the official blueprint. 
Great local great family clans actively manipulate and monopolize scarce political, social, and 
economic resources flows in the local society. In this process, inequalities and social 
stratification were created: small business owners and migrant workers who lack of such social 
capital are often marginalized, and their upward social mobilization is more difficult compared to 
members of the local great family clans. In most cases I observed in the Zhoushan industry 
cluster, opportunities are not equally available to every factory owner. Those with more social 
capital who maintain good relations with key agencies are more likely to survive and succeed in 
the seafood business. Successful seafood factory owners take this interaction rule for granted and 
internalize China’s bureaucratic ideology to guide their behaviors: on the one hand, they actively 
expand and maintain social relations with key agencies across the industry through partying, 
sending gifts, and using other obscure ways to exchange scarce resources from those key 
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agencies; on the other hand, most factory owners are good at playing the game in the grey zone. 
They utilize all available resources to maximize rewards (even some activities might break the 
law) and self-regulate their behaviors within government guidelines. By applying official 
rewards and punishments, China’s central government and government of Zhoushan Islands can 
govern the population, control factory owner’s activities, and guide local economic development. 
One example is Henry’s factory receiving more official attention and subsidy because his 
product perfectly aligned with the government economic upgrading plan.             
Secondly, compared to other industrial clusters, industrial-college collaboration is also 
significant in this case. This industry-college cooperation is directly incorporated into local 
government economic upgrading plan to accelerate academic achievements extension to industry 
sectors. On the one hand, this industrial-college collaboration is a win-win strategy: college 
researchers can get considerable economic rewards through selling research achievements to 
local factories; seafood factories can receive in-time technology support to facilitate their high-
tech projects, promote production and increase competitiveness in the market. On the other hand, 
however, since the legal definition and official explanation on such intersectional cooperation are 
not clear and often ambiguous, the industry-college interaction can involve deviant behaviors 
such as bribery and embezzlement. It also poses questions on the commodification of knowledge 
and corruption. In Professor Lin’s case, his team is profit-oriented, which means economic 
reward is the primary factor they care about in research. The evaluation of knowledge in science 
discourse is commercialized - only profitable knowledge could gain its legitimacy in the 
knowledge system. The commodification of knowledge would challenge the moral value and 
commonsense of science we take in academia.  
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In the next chapter, I will dive into the seafood industrial cluster at Zhoushan Islands, 
focusing on stratified seafood factory structure and labor arrangement. Chapter Five will 
comprehensively analyze how family-based seafood factory owners utilize the bureaucratic 
ideology they internalized from China’s political economy, and then discuss how seafood 
factories enforce all-dimensional surveillance with a patriarchal tendency to establish absolute 


























The economic take-off at Zhoushan Islands has two sides: one, the luxury lifestyle, 
exclusive benefits generated from the closed elite social networks and industrial prosperity of the 
factory owners; the other, the everyday struggles experienced by millions of ordinary workers. 
Seasonal labor migration patterns can be observed at Zhoushan Islands. Migrant workers flow 
over into this area for jobs, especially during the fishing season. Most migrant workers are 
working at sectors that do not require formal qualifications or professional skills; they usually 
occupy most production jobs in seafood processing factories or work as temporary day laborers 
at the harbor. This section uncovers the hidden side of seafood production, emphasizing factory 
organizational structure, surveillance, and labor arrangement in the seafood industry cluster. 
Following this, this chapter will unpack a comprehensive discussion of how local residency, 
education, and gender reinforce inner factory stratification and ongoingly produce inequalities 
between migrant, unskilled workers, and other workers.    
 
Local Residency 
A household registration system (hukou) was established by China’s central government 
in 1958 to better manage national social, economic resources based on registered residency. In 
practice this policy grants exclusive access to state-funded social welfare resources to urban 
residents while leaving rural residents behind (Andreas and Zhan 2016). In August 1964, 
Regulations on Household Registration Based Domestic Migration was launched and enforced 
by China’s Ministry of Public Security to restrict rural-to-urban migration. Illegal migration was 
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prohibited by law with severe state punishments. Before China’s marketization push in the late 
1970s, most peasants were tied to state- or communal-owned farmland and only allowed to make 
living through farming.  
When China ushered in the current era of modernization, rapid industrialization and 
urbanization were intertwined with strong patriotism upheld by China’s central government to 
boost nationwide economic development. In the name of patriotism, individuals are motivated 
and organized by China’s government to pursue national economic growth, no matter the cost. 
Behind the slogan of industrialization and modernization, a large amount of unskilled wage-labor 
is wanted to keep the manufactory sector working in urban China. Peasants are targeted by the 
state to sacrifice themselves for national development (Yeh et al. 2013).  
In the mid-1980, China’s central government withdrew its restriction on domestic rural-
to-urban migration and encouraged peasants to take jobs in non-agricultural sectors in cities (Xue 
et al. 2021). China’s peasants were removed from farmland and turned into wage-laborers in 
cities. They were squeezed by asymmetrical national policies and inadequate subsistence in 
cities. Since most migrant peasants are identified as rural residents, they are often excluded from 
urban safety networks and must take care of themselves. Under this circumstance, migrant 
peasants comprise the lowest social class in cities. As the primary residents in urban slums, 
migrant workers become the most vulnerable group who bear the main burden of the enormous 
negative consequences of China’s rapid development.  
Inequalities are exacerbated with intensified social stratification, with the rise of new 
money and urban poor in cities. This is true for the migrant workers in Zhoushan seafood 
factories as in the rest of China. As one male migrant seafood worker reports: 
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“We are the outsider in this city, no one really cares about us, although he (the owner) 
provides us free dorms equipped with basic living facilities, he is still the boss and we are 
working for him.”  
 
It is incomplete to tell a story of the marginalized without recognizing the exclusive 
benefits enjoyed by the privileged. City residents enjoy invisible privileges such as better 
schools, state-funded urban health, endowment insurance and housing allowance. These 
privileges are often taken for granted, yet enlarge the gap between urban residents and rural 
migrant workers. The state uses nationalism to normalize these inequalities and urge individuals 
to ignore these systematic inequalities. The story of successful local businessmen is recorded by 
the government and broadcasted as the model of the China Dream, a discourse proposed by 
chairman Xi in 2013.  
By portraying Zhoushan Islands as the next city ready to take off in its golden period of 
development, the local government is able to persuade migrant workers that grand opportunity is 
waiting for them as long as they can seize it and work hard. A male worker from Henan province 
told me,  
“If we work hard, we can buy a small apartment in this city and become real city 
dwellers, my daughter and even my grandchildren can benefit from this decision.”  
 
For most migrant workers in cities like Zhoushan Islands, buying property is the major 
way to earn urban residency. Establishing urban roots means a lot to rural-to-urban migrant 
workers, not only because they and their families are able to access the urban safety net and 
high-quality social resources, but because it marks their successful upward mobility–from the 
“unenlightened peasant” to “decent urban citizen”.  
 “City islands” near the ocean with well-equipped luxury villa-clusters have mushroomed 
in recent years, with villas selling for outrageous prices. At the city of Zhoushan Islands, local 
rural residents who received government compensation for official land acquisition become the 
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new parvenu. They are the major buyers of apartments in nearby cities. Since local rural 
residents are able to keep their rural homestead, they often lease urban apartments to migrants 
and visitors to earn additional household income. The Zhoushan Islands society is being ripped 
apart by intensified inequalities. Even though upward mobility is still possible for the 
“outsiders”, it is almost impossible for migrant workers without sufficient family capital to 
become the next billionaire in this city. Local residency not only creates a gap between local 
residents and migrant workers in housing and wealth, but it also shapes the pattern of labor 
hierarchy inside seafood processing factories.  
 
The Organization and Supervision of Seafood Factory Workers  
A primary characteristic of family-operated factories is that the owner acts like a family 
master or “big brother” in charge of factory affairs and decision making, as well as taking 
responsibility to feed the workers and negotiate with outside agencies. This factory paternalism 
is a cultural tradition inherited from the long-standing patriarchal system in China.   
David (anonymous name) owns a tuna processing factory right next to Wanger’s 
company. David showed me the production plant and processing facility in his factory. Standing 
on the second floor, a huge glass wall separates us from the producing department. The whole 
workshop was clearly presented under us. Around 200 female workers were assigned to five 
rows and busy with cleaning tunas. Each row was supervised by a male taskmaster who stood by 
the end of production line and is in charge of product quality control. There was a loudspeaker 
on the ceiling inside the processing facility and a female supervisor kept calling out the 
employee identification number of any worker she saw who moved too slowly. This surveillance 
strategy of “naming and shaming” is used to urge workers to work faster. By calling out 
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worker’s identification number aloud in front of other workers, supervisors are able to apply 
psychological pressure to specific workers by putting them at the spot. Name calling thus aims to 
discipline workers by labeling them as “lazy”, “inertia” or different from others. Workers 
internalized such symbolic meanings and often feel “shameful” to be named in front of people 
they know. Workers internalize the factory rules and self-govern themselves to behave 
appropriately in the production line.   
David explains the piecework system of factory worker payment and other practices as 
benefiting workers but notes that they still have trouble hiring workers.    
“They (workers) will get paid based on how much pounds of tuna they cleaned, whoever 
works more gets more so they are willing to work, most of them can earn 4,000 to 8,000 
yuan per month (570 to 1,142 in dollars). We would rent coaches to send workers back 
home for Chinese Lunar New Year, then pick them up and drive back to factory for free. 
This is great, right? But we are still short in labor because they (workers) are greedy and 
don’t know what gratefulness is.”  
 
Most production line workers in David’s factory are migrants from out-of-town. Only 
local residents are eligible for management positions and less important positions as group 
leaders. Since there is a dialect widely spoken by locals at Zhoushan Islands, which is different 
from mandarin, it is often difficult for migrant workers to understand and speak that language. 
Factory managers and supervisors prefer to use the local dialect when talking in front of migrant 
workers to maintain control. In this situation, workers are often quiet and focus on their work 
since they know they are supervised. Since the language barrier prevents migrant workers from 
understanding the conversation between managers, they have no idea if the factory supervisor is 
talking about them, and thus to avoid name calling and other punishment they stay silent and 
keep working. Supervisors move around in the factory to monitor production activities and 
correct any undesirable behaviors. Factory managers and supervisors use “naming and shaming” 
and speaking in the local dialect as strategies to maintain their power over migrant workers, to 
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discipline worker’s bodies, minds and psyches. Through utilizing language as the instrument to 
structure the labor hierarchy in factory, migrant worker’s body is reduced to a screw of the 
production line and their personality is erased.    
In sum, owners of family-managed factory, almost all of them are male, acting like the 
“big brother” who is in charge of complicated issues within and outside the “family”. On the one 
hand, the owner must care for every member in his factory and maintain absolute power in terms 
of every decision made for the factory. On the other hand, owners often take machines, facilities 
and workers in factory as his own properties, he is the “king” of the factory, he is able to 
surveillant the whole factory and centralize power in his hand through controlling the patronage 
of critical positions, since it is his responsibility for his own gains and losses. In next section, I 
will explain the logic of family master further through discussing how factory owners interact 
with workers and outside agencies, as well as mobilize social resources through their own 
familiar-based social networks.            
 
Labor Hierarchy 
 In seafood processing factories, labor hierarchy based on residency, gender and education 
level is salient through all the cases I observed. Labor arrangements are organized by three types 
of labor contracts: seasonal short-term labor contracts for temporary migrant and local workers, 
annual labor contracts for loyal migrant workers and migrants who intend to dwell at Zhoushan 
Islands, and long-term labor contracts for skilled, highly educated migrant workers and local 





TABLE 1: Patterns of Contract Labor in Seafood Processing Factories 
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Seasonal short-term labor contracts which vary from three to six months are designed for 
seasonal migrant workers and local rural residents who want to earn additional household 
income. At Zhoushan Islands, a large amount of wage labor is needed during the fishing season. 
There is a four-month fishing moratorium from early May to mid-September enforced by the 
local government to protect the spawning grounds and ocean ecology. The seafood industry is 
highly seasonal and depends on the climate and local policies. Outside seafood product orders 
sent to seafood factories often overwhelm the factories from mid-summer till the late spring in 
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the following year. Seasonal short-term labor contract is a flexible way for seafood processing 
factories to recruit temporary workers. Seafood workers do not need specific skills, work 
experience or qualifications to be competent for seasonal factory jobs. Seasonal jobs are often 
simple, repetitious and tedious: uploading and unloading raw material, cleaning tuna and squid, 
de-shelling crabs, cooking and processing raw marine products, monitoring and timing machines, 
packaging, etc.  
Zhoushan seafood factories commit to provide seasonal workers with free 
accommodation, complimentary workday lunch, and industry injury insurance. Workers are not 
required to live in the factory. Some factories do not provide minimum hourly wage; temporary 
workers are paid piece rates according to the amount of work they finish. Under this labor 
contract, most workers will be paid bi-weekly and few day laborers may settle their wages on a 
daily-basis. Bi-weekly payroll is utilized by factory owners to attract temporary workers who 
need instant cash yet are detained to work longer at the same factory. Since there is no severe 
penalty for breaking labor contracts, workers may quit one job and quickly switch to another 
factory if they are not satisfied with the wage. The only thing factory owners can do to prevent 
this is putting holds on workers’ salaries, requiring that contracted workers work at least two 
weeks to get their first paycheck. This strategy is commonly utilized by seafood processing 
factories to cope with labor shortage during the fishing season.  
Seafood factory wages in the fishing season is not fixed, Zhoushan factories may be 
willing to provide higher wages than normal to recruit more seasonal workers and complete an 
order in time. Wage negotiations between seasonal temporary workers and factory owners are 
possible at this time. Migrant workers often stay with people from their home area and one 
eloquent male representative is often selected by his peers to negotiate wages with factory 
 
 71 
representatives. In this situation, men are seen as legitimate decision-makers to decide important 
life events, negotiate with outside agencies and maximize benefits for his family and peer 
groups, following the same logic of family master as factory owners.  
The negotiation process between seasonal workers and Zhoushan factories is often forth 
and back. For example, after requesting a wage from factory A, a worker representative would 
add 500 yuan (RMB) or more to the original price and take it as bargaining chip to request higher 
wages from factory B. Although factory owners may maintain personal social connections with 
each other, they are competing for workers during the fishing season and rarely exchange 
information with competitors. Some factory owners would be willing to offer comparable wages 
even though they know that workers are misrepresenting the wages they are being offered, since 
the profit from completing orders on timely is considerable compared to the slightly increased 
labor cost.     
To ensure safety and property security, most Zhoushan factories have strict curfew to 
discipline workers. At Henry’s factory the gatekeeper locks the front door at 11pm every night, 
workers must be back to their dorm before curfew and are not allowed to go outside from 
midnight to morning. As Henry explains, 
“You know, we have provided great accommodation and benefits to them (workers), 
basic four-bed rooms are equipped with air conditioner and private bathroom, if they 
(workers) are married and have kids, they can request a single room to live together…but 
as you can see, since we must enforce the curfew, many of them (workers) would be 
willing to pay additional 700 to 1000 yuan (RMB) a month to lease a room in nearby 
village, they (workers) feel unfree to sleep in the factory.”  
 
Zhoushan factory owners try to discipline and control workers’ bodies through providing 
free accommodation, food, paying bi-weekly and enforcing curfew, but workers often try to 
escape factory regulations and make their lives better utilizing any resources available to them. 
Instead of living at the factory for free, many migrant seafood workers lease a room and live with 
 
 72 
their own family members or friends in nearby villages, even this means spending additional 
time and money on commuting. Workers with savings use their own electric motorcycles 
commuting between home and factory. Motorcycles provide the most cost-efficient 
transportation and enable workers to take control of their lunch break and manage what to eat. 
Seasonal migrant seafood workers thus gain a sense of autonomy.  
 Seafood processing factory offer annual labor contracts to migrant workers who are 
loyal to the factory or willing to dwell at Zhoushan Islands permanently. Workers need to sign 
the labor contract with the seafood factory each year. They get paid either bi-weekly or monthly 
as they prefer. Annual contracting workers enjoy the same benefits as seasonal temporary 
workers, but they are more likely to be promoted in the factory because they have the long-term 
trust of seafood factory owners. Many annual contracting workers have a strong sense of 
belonging and rarely switch to other factories. However, since many annual contracting workers 
are migrants, they are excluded from the management layer and often appointed to less important 
positions without real power in factory. Seafood factory owners usually appoint their relatives 
and acquaintances to positions like manufacture shop manager, doorkeeper, supervisor and 
security guard to ensure the owner’s absolute control of the factory.  
Annual labor contracts are also often utilized by factories to contract with groups of 
migrant workers from the same area. In David’s tuna processing factory, most migrant workers 
come from the same village in Yunnan, Sichuan and Anhui province. David signs an annual 
labor contract with the whole village and arranges a special coach to transport workers directly to 
his factory for free. As David says, 
 “Yes, we sign annual labor contract with the whole village, workers can focus on their 
work if be surrounded by peers they already known; we also prefer to sign the labor 
contract with couples who intend to migrate for jobs, if workers come to my factory with 
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families, they are less likely to quit the job because stability should be prioritized in their 
decision-making process.”   
 
When I visited David’s factory, he was planning to renew his annual labor contracts with 
migrant workers for the following year. Workers are required to sign the contract before going 
back home for Chinese Lunar New Year if they want to continue working at this seafood factory. 
David already ordered a special bus to transport contracted workers back home and pick them up 
after the new year break. This labor strategy is utilized by most seafood processing factory 
owners to secure their source of labor and guarantee year-round production. As David makes 
clear, the reason why factories prefer to sign contracts with couples and groups is because 
workers are more stable. When they are accompanied by family members and people they know, 
workers are less likely to quit and thus the factory can secure and stabilize its labor source.        
For both seasonal temporary and annual contracting laborers who are working on the 
production line, the general monthly income ranges from 4,000 to 8,000 yuan (RMB). The 
average working time is 10.5 hours per day. Workers are allowed to have two days off each 
month (supervisors and managers take time off by turns in order to watch the factory for the 
owner).      
Long-term labor contracts are designed for both local administrative staff and migrant 
skilled technicians, highly educated employees who specialize in food science, finance, 
accounting and international trading. The duration of this labor contract is depending upon the 
negotiation between factory owner and worker. Seafood factories provide long-term contracted 
workers exclusive access to staff welfare, social insurance and housing funds. Administrative 
staffs, food engineers and research and development department employees are ranked just one 
level lower than the general factory manager. Employees working in these sectors get paid 
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decent salaries and enjoy great prestige associated with their occupations. They can take 
weekends off, work eight hours a day and enjoy annual paid vacation.  
At Henry’s factory for example, the long-term labor contract is utilized to contract out 
research and development activities. The cost of establishing and operating its own research and 
development department (R&D) is prohibitive, especially for a family-owned business, but 
Henry’s main product depends upon up-to-date technology to maintain its market 
competitiveness. By collaborating with Professor Lin and his team, Henry is able to focus on 
production and marketing and take advantage of the scientific discoveries and inventions 
produced by Lin’s team without spending additional money on science and technology. Henry 
funds Lin’s research, he pays monthly salaries to Lin’s graduate students and distributes 
dividends to Lin’s team annually. This type of enterprise-college cooperation is encouraged by 
the local government and universities under the guidance of accelerating science and technology 
achievements conversion proposed by China’s central government in the 13th Five-Year Plan. In 
this case, Henry is able to mobilize social, economic and material resources through his personal 
social networks and take advantage of favorable policies to support his factory.    
In the seafood factories of Zhoushan Islands, hierarchical labor arrangements ensure that 
factory owners control the production process and workers’ bodies. Differences in education, 
skills, gender, local residency and migrant status are utilized by factory owner to dissolve 
potential solidarity between workers. Middle-layer positions are created and often taken by local 
workers to enforce factory surveillance on lower-layer migrant workers. Indoor cameras are 
everywhere, factory owners can watch the whole production line by sitting in their well-
decorated office. Factory owners do not need to be present in the manufacturing facility to 
discipline workers, they can send commands to middle-layer managers, and the supervisor will 
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take care of the rest. Any commands and private conversations between factory owner and 
supervisors/managers are given in local dialect. This language barrier prevents unskilled migrant 
workers from participating in factory decision-making and keeps them at the periphery. Similar 
regulatory and surveillant mechanisms are used across all seafood processing factories in this 
industrial cluster.  
Figure 4 shows the management structure in Henry’s factory. As shown there, as the 
General Manager, Henry controls all sectors in his factory. He has the absolute power to directly 
appoint and dismiss members of the management layer and decide the fate of every migrant 
workers.  
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Gender Hierarchy  
There is a clear gender hierarchy in the seafood processing factories at Zhoushan Islands. 
Nearly all the important factory positions in management are occupied by men. Women are 
concentrated in typical “female occupations” like accountant, cashier and secretary at the 
administrative level. They are also found in jobs require finicky procedures such as de-shelling 
crab, scaling tuna, packaging and cleaning the production line. Even though factory workers get 
paid according to the amount of work they finish, women often occupy lower-paid positions 
compared to male workers. In Zhoushan seafood industry, female workers are concentrated in 
labor intensive tasks both inside the factory and on the dock, where women workers can be seen 
doing picking and sorting work.  
Different from factory orders, fresh seafood for direct sale need to be classified based on 
weight and quality prior to packaging. Marine product dealers recruit migrant and local female 
workers through causal labor contracts in the fishing season to do this labor-intensive work. The 
daily wage for these workers usually ranges from 80 to 120 yuan (RMB). It was wintertime 
when I visited SJM harbor and the temperature was about 38 degrees Fahrenheit. Women 
workers were sitting outside and were busy with sorting swimming crabs from ice water. 
Delivery trucks waited, ready to leave as soon as they were fully loaded, right behind the seafood 
dealer’s store. These deliveries are often done by professional courier services companies or self-
employed truck drivers. Efficiency is the first command. Frozen raw seafood directly unloaded 
from the fishing vessels needs to be packaged and transported to the right destination in time, 
otherwise it will be stale and devalued. Workers play the key role in connecting different sectors 
in local marine industry and maintaining the complex, interlocked seafood production network, 




This chapter reviews the stratified seafood factory structure and how inequalities were 
produced in Zhoushan seafood industry clusters. In this conclusion, I want to elaborate on three 
key arguments.  
Firstly, seafood factory owners acting like “family masters” with absolute control over 
factory affairs. They are disciplining worker’s minds and bodies by utilizing a set of strategies. 
As Foucault stated, power comes from the force relations in society; it stands, organizes, and 
struggles on its own within such force relations ([1978] 1990). Foucault then outlined how 
discourse governing the population: individuals in society would internalize the knowledge, 
rules, and ideologies within the discourse to self-govern their behaviors ([1978] 1990). 
Foucault’s conceptualization of power, discourse, and governmentality can be applied to analyze 
inner factory surveillance at Zhoushan Islands. Power in seafood factories comes from the force 
relations among factory owners, supervisors, and workers. To maximize profits, factory owners 
installed 24/7 surveillance facilities, set curfews and bi-weekly payroll systems, provide 
accommodation, and control worker’s means of traveling to discipline workers. Factory 
supervisors use the “naming and shaming” strategy and speak dialect in front of workers to 
clarify factory rules. Workers, on the opposite, often internalize factory rules to avoid 
punishments and stay silent in front of supervisors. However, workers are not always submitting 
to supervisors. They often mobilize available resources to produce autonomy and fight to control 
their lives. For example, migrant workers would stay with people they know, collectively 
negotiate wages with factory representatives, rent apartments outside the factory, and purchase 
their means of traveling. In some cases, workers would also maintain long-term trust 
relationships with factory owners to accelerate their promotion. The power dynamic in seafood 
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factories is not static. It is fluid and being ongoingly shaped by all agencies involved in factory 
force relations. This specific circumstance in seafood factories is why the negotiation between 
factory regulatory agencies and migrant workers is often forward and back.  
Secondly, different from industrialization often ended up with overproduction and 
unemployment in capitalist societies, labor shortage emerged in Zhoushan seafood industrial 
cluster when industrialization in this area is still on the way up. At the early stage of Zhoushan 
seafood processing, peasant workers migrated from China’s economically backward areas to this 
place for production jobs. But with China’s rapid economic growth in recent decades, the wage 
gap between coastal regions and inland areas is narrowing down. As a consequence, rural 
workers are no longer willing to leave home for jobs. Seafood processing factories at Zhoushan 
Islands are experiencing severe labor shortages, especially during the fishing season. The 
government provides local seafood factories two options to handle labor shortage, either 
increasing wages or shifting to highly mechanized production. Factory owners who failed to 
follow the government’s order might be disciplined through multiple ways in addition to laws. 
For instance, factory owners are facing stricter official environmental assessment, having a 
longer waiting time to get government approval, and experiencing frequent mandatory shut down 
for official safety inspections, etc.   
Finally, migrant worker’s experience is shaped by the stratified factory structure in this 
seafood industrial clusters and by past and current government policies of modernization. PRC’s 
past urban-prioritized development strategies attached exclusive benefits to urban residency 
based on rural areas’ sacrifice. Specifically, PRC prioritized first-tier cities and east coast regions 
for economic development. It assumed developed regions could facilitate the development of 
economically backward regions. This development logic created a great wealth gap in mainland 
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China. Higher wages and modern life in cities motivated poor peasants to migrate to Zhoushan 
Islands for jobs. In the beginning, this massive labor migration fueled fishing industrialization at 
Zhoushan Islands. However, the development gap between coast and inland regions was 
narrowing down in recent decades. Besides there was no sufficient government support to 
migrant workers. As a consequence, labor shortage emerged as a significant problem in 
Zhoushan seafood industrial clusters. In recent years, PRC is officially urging migrant peasants 
to return to their home villages and starting their businesses. Government policy shifts intensified 
the labor shortage in Zhoushan industrial clusters. PRC’s structural adjustment plan might 
benefit the whole nation, but seafood factory owners bore a significant burden of labor shortage 
in Zhoushan industrial clusters. China’s society is organized by collectivity and patriotism. These 
dominant ideologies reducing individuals to screws of the giant development machine in modern 
China. 
Although local residency’s relative privilege and deficiency screw migrant workers to the 
disadvantaged position in factories, workers from the local area cannot always benefit from their 
local residency. There is a different story to tell about local workers from nearby rural villages. 
With a comprehensive review of PRC’s major rural urbanization and rural tourism policies, the 
next chapter will discuss social dynamics and inequalities in the rural Zhoushan Islands. Chapter 
six emphasizing how inner rural village income inequalities and stratification were pushing the 
marginalized villagers to sell their labor for living in seafood factories and other local service 
sectors. This representing the other side of labor arrangement and the stratified seafood factory 












The success of seafood factory production at Zhoushan Islands depends on factory access 
to a stable labor source. While migrant workers make up most of the labor force in the factory 
production line, female villagers in their fifties to sixties from nearby rural communities 
represent another vital source of labor for the Zhoushan industrial cluster. These middle-aged 
workers from nearby rural villages represent a distinct set of workers who face their work 
opportunities and constraints. Rural residents who have good social relations with seafood 
factory owners are more likely to be appointed to management positions in the factory, 
especially for direct relatives of factory owners or village cadres. Seafood factory owners 
represent new economic elites while village cadres represent traditional local power elites at 
Zhoushan Islands. Their cooperation generates mutual beneficiary relations between these two 
parties as the strategy to secure the dominant social position of great family clans in this area. 
Although local residency gives local workers exclusive access to workplace benefits - such as 
long-term labor contracts, quick promotion, and higher status in factories - they are squeezed by 
overtime factory work and inner rural village inequalities. Village inequalities are the primary 
social force pushing local residents to sell labor in seafood factories.  
This chapter explores inner village inequalities in nearby rural communities as a 
structural force perpetuating the current labor pattern in the Zhoushan seafood industry cluster. It 
provides a comprehensive analysis of current rural village demographic characters. This chapters 
shows how government-led rural urbanization projects, rural tourism, and village regulatory 
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hierarchy (re)produce unpredictable inner-village social stratification and income inequalities, to 
explain why some rural villagers must go out and find jobs for a living.      
As He, a retired government official who used to work at the Bureau of Labor, explains,  
“The average annual per capita income in rural Zhoushan Islands is around 20,000 
yuan, which takes a half of annual per capita income of urban residents, but only a very 
small fraction of rural household income directly comes from farming and most young 
rural generation migrating to nearby cities for education or better-paid jobs.”  
 
Since 2008, China proposed the “integration of rural-urban development strategy” to 
narrow the development disparities between cities and the countryside (Liu et al. 2018:247). The 
rural-urban integration strategy plays a crucial role in PRC’s New Socialist Countryside project, 
which aims to reduce rural poverty, improve infrastructure construction and living quality, and 
promote countryside urbanization. Land acquisition for government-planned urbanization 
projects has fundamentally transformed traditional rural communities at Zhoushan Islands.  
“If the government requisitions the rural homestead, generally five million yuan in 
compensation will be directly paid to the family,” He continued, “they (rural residents 
whose land being requisitioned) can purchase estates and stores in nearby cities and 
don’t need to farm anymore.”  
 
According to government annual reports and officials, rural residents at Zhoushan Islands 
live a comfortable life with decent household income (Zhoushan Chorography 1992). People do 
not struggle to survive. With the acceleration of urbanization, PRC proposing rural urbanization 
as the next step to improve the rural living environment and quality of life.  
Rural diversification is evident in the area. Cultural and Buddhist tourism is combined 
with rural entertainment as a new strategy to attract visitors and increase local household income. 
Most rural villages at Zhoushan Islands are unique for their farming and fishing combination 
based on abundant ocean resources. However, the rise of seafood industry clusters and 
commercial tourist industries profoundly have transformed traditional rural livelihoods. At the 
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city level, policies favoring the industrial cluster, seafood free trading zone, and rural tourism 
have contributed a lot to the local economic boom and have fostered economic upgrading. But at 
the village level, inequalities and income polarization are intensified. A new round of social 
stratification within rural villages is happening at Zhoushan Islands, though it often stays 
invisible from the public.  
 
Background: Aging Rural Community and Labor Out-Migration  
A dominant labor migration pattern at villages of Zhoushan Islands is that almost all 
younger generations move to nearby cities and even other countries for education or jobs. Only 
the middle-aged and elderly rural residents stay in their home villages. Different from other less 
developed rural parts of China where young people migrate to get out of poverty, at Zhoushan 
Islands the main purpose of out-migration for young rural populations is improving their life 
quality and seeking an urban life-style. Young local people, born after 1990, are rarely seen 
working at seafood processing factories as production workers. Younger people avoid this work 
because they hold higher education or professional degrees and are qualified for better jobs in 
cities, but also because they have different lifestyles and worldviews than the older generation. 
The young rural generation in this area have received modern education and been exposed to a 
fast-changing world with internet and advanced technologies, giving them a different worldview 
and values of life than their parents. Most young people are not willing to follow the traditional 
way of life and submit to traditional political expectations. They choose to migrate to cities for 
the life they have dreamed of. As a father of a girl who has been studying in Australia for seven 
years said, “Zhoushan is too small for young people, we hope she could find her way of life”. 
Out-migration is a strategy utilized by many families at Zhoushan Islands for upward social 
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mobility. Many would like to move from this third line island city to international first-tier cities 
with more plentiful social resources.  
Although young rural population do receive modern education and hold different values, 
few of them choose to back to their home village. The area’s closed traditional lifestyle and 
social arrangements have been broken down by neoliberal policies and new ideologies, but they 
are not dying. The older generation resists modern political, social and cultural concepts as well 
as lifestyle. The PRC’s modernized political system and regulation mechanisms aim to 
fundamentally replace the traditional patriarchal regulatory regime ruled by men with a scientific 
political system ruled by laws. However, this replacement is incomplete. The ingrained family-
managing system and intertwined social networks based on familiar relations in this area shape 
the way social resources are distributed, manipulating patterns established by the law. In rural 
Zhoushan, a new regulatory system is taking root which combines modern laws and traditional 
patriarchal regulations. Some people benefit a lot from this system, while the others are 
marginalized in current rural society.     
 
The Rise of Rural Tourism 
 Located at the far east of China and next to Zhoushan seafood industry cluster, Mount 
Putuo is one of the most famous four Buddhist tourist resorts in China with a long history of 
Kwan-yin culture and Mazu belief. As former official He says: 
“Mount Putuo is the most famous Buddhist tourist resort in East China, faith in Kwan-
yin constitutes an important part of local resident’s daily life… at Mount Putuo, the small 
island only takes 12.5 square kilometers, passenger volume can reach to sixteen to 
seventeen million a year… especially during the period of major Buddhist pilgrim 
association, traditional hotels cannot meet visitor’s accommodation need, Bed and 
Breakfast (BNB) operated by local residents is proposed by Zhoushan City as an efficient 




Being situated in the archipelago rich in natural beauty, combined with the long-standing 
Buddhist faith, the complex constitutes the unique island landscape for tourism at Mount Putuo. 
China’s Buddhist Academy of Mt. Putuo, the most distinguished Buddhist college is also located 
at this small island. Polytheism is a central element of Chinese belief system. Traditionally, there 
are hundreds of gods Chinese people would seek help from when confronted with different 
difficulties in their lives. Ordinary Chinese people conduct religious rituals and ask gods from 
different religions for help. For example, in Buddhism, there are thousands of buddhas 
responsible for different duties to maintain order in secular life. If a couple wants a baby, they 
may pray to Songzi Kwan-yin, the god of reproduction, to be blessed with healthy children; they 
may pray to the God of wealth for fortune or pray to the God of life for good health and well-
being. People don’t need to identify as a believer of one specific religion. Religious ritual is 
integrated into people’s everyday life. At Mount Putuo, everyone can pray to Kwan-yin 
Avaloktesvara for personal wishes, as long as they vow to the god when their wishes are fulfilled 
to return to Mount Putuo and burn incense for the Buddha. This cultural tradition is utilized by 
Zhoushan’s tourist department as the main selling point to attract visitors and facilitate the local 
tourist industry.  
Since the annual visitor volume exceeds the reception capacity that local commercial 
hotels can provide, the local government encourages residents to operate their own Bed and 
Breakfast (BNB) or Airbnb businesses, thereby meeting the demand for accommodation and 
boosting the local economy. BNBs constitute an important part of local resident’s annual 
household income.  
Zhoushan’s Beautiful Countryside Construction project identifies BNBs as a way to 
facilitate rural tourism and alleviate rural poverty. Since the 2008s, PRC started encouraging 
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rural migrant workers to return to the countryside and start new undertaking. In 2015, China’s 
General Office of the CCP Central Committee published the Opinion on Supporting Rural 
Migrant Workers Return Home Villages to Start Their Own Businesses as a key step of PRC’s 
rural development plan. Reversing policies which encouraged peasants to migrate to cities to 
facilitate China’s urbanization in the late 1980s, new policies forced massive labor migration 
from urban to rural areas. As scholars stated, the number of migrant workers from the 
countryside to cities increased annually from 2009 to 2019, but its growth rate peaked in 2010 
and slowly decreased afterward (Xue et al. 2021). Rural Entrepreneurship was proposed by PRC 
in 2012 and been incorporated into PRC’s 2018 Rural Revitalization Development strategies, to 
create new employments for returning migrant workers and alleviate rural poverty (Xue et al. 
2021).  Rural industry, self-employed businesses and rural leisure tourism were advocated by the 
government in this period of time. 
BNBs as a new self-operated tourist business not only correspond to China’s government 
development plan, but also allow Zhoushan Islands residents to utilize the available resource 
they have to earn additional household income. According to China’s land laws, rural residents 
have the use right over their homestead, but no private ownership. Rural residents can construct 
their own house as they wish. Almost all rural households I visited have self-built houses with 
three or four stories and some of them would lease rooms to migrant workers or visitors. Rural 
residents whose homesteads are requisitioned by the government can either choose to be 
compensated in cash or newly built houses and apartments. Some of these rural people have used 
the government-compensated house as a family-based hotel and provide bed-and-breakfast 
services. BNB owners post advertisements with photos on travel applicants to attract visitors and 
most BNBs only operate during the summer tourist season. Most BNB owners have their own 
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work; they live in nearby cities and only come back for business during the summertime. While a 
few hosts who own the complex rely fully on BNB income for their living, most BNB owners 
use this as supplemental household income.  
The familiar-based social networks also play an important role in running successful 
BNBs. He’s wife, Wang, is the first people to start a BNB business at Zhoushan Islands. 
Wang was able to obtain inside information about future policy actions to encourage BNBs 
from her husband and bought a sea-view commercial apartment to take advantage of this new 
tourist business opportunity. Although the local government encourages residents to run 
BNBs, official technical support and business training are insufficient or non-available to 
small business owners. As Wang recalls,  
“At the beginning, we have no idea about how to run BNBs, we must learn to use the 
software, register travel applicants, clean and prepare the room, as well as take pictures 
and finish all the posting by ourselves… my son is a college student, he helped us a lot in 
this process, this is your own business, and you are responsible for your profit and loss.”  
 
However, not all rural residents are lucky enough to benefit from the government 
renovation and poverty alleviation project. People whose homestead is not included in the 
official land acquisition plan and don’t have enough economic resource cannot afford their own 
BNBs or other small businesses. Villages away from the main road and seafood processing zone 
are often not included in the government renovation plan. These residents are struggling and 
must sell their labor to make a living. Even for rural residents who have the economic capacity to 
run BNBs, if they are illiterate or not familiar with the internet, they are often excluded from the 
market. Middle-aged and senior rural residents without internet skills and necessary educational 
background are not likely to be successful in running small businesses like BNBs. There is no 
special policy support or protection for these disadvantaged small business owners.  
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In China, people who hold rural residency are not qualified for official retirement 
allowance. Only peasants over 70 can get a small pension (around 200 yuan/month) from the 
government. But it is difficult for an adult to survive with 200 yuan a month at Zhoushan Islands. 
Three senior villagers of Gan Shiao I interviewed told me that 150 to 200-yuan pension is the 
only income they received each month from the government. Unless they are village cadres, the 
elderly rural residents have to either rely on remittance sent from their children or sell their labor 
for a living. For example, a female villager in her middle fifty’s living alone (her son and 
daughter work in nearby cities and are only back home during the Lunar New Year), has to work 
as a cleaner in a luxury hotel at Zhoushan city to make a living.  
 Gan Shiao, a village near the Zhoushan seafood processing zone is one of the models for 
Beautiful Countryside project. Cultural tourism represents a significant proportion of village 
income. Located on the hillside, without enough farming land and far from the sea, villagers of 
Gan Shiao used to rely for a living on craftwork. Shipwright, carpenter, brickie, stoneman and 
bamboo craftsmanship are traditional folkways in Gan Shiao. This cultural heritage is rewarded 
and is utilized by the local village committee to build the rural tourist industry.  
Major village cadres founded a tourism company to collectively build, maintain and 
regulate tourist facilities in Gan Shiao. Li, a cadre member of the village committee who is 
responsible for the village traveling service, can earn two monthly salaries from his village 
committee and tourism company work.  
“Since I’m the member of village committee and being in charge of tourism company, I 
will get paid 500 yuan from the government and additional 2200 yuan from the 
company,” Li said.  
 
This tourist company is collectively owned and operated by the village, but the income 
made from utilizing public resources is not shared with ordinary villagers of Gan Shiao. Village 
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cadres get paid monthly and enjoy retirement allowance since they are government staffs. Other 
villagers are excluded from such benefits. Regarding to the tourist income, as the village 
secretary stated, “the income is not enough to cover the cost of public facilities maintenance, so 
we don’t have leftover to share with villagers.” Village cadre do not want these issues discussed. 
When I interviewed villagers, some villagers refused to talk with me when the close friends or 
family members of the village cadre were present. As one villager said: “we are afraid to be 
punished”.       
In Gan Shiao, rural BNBs and farm stays represent a popular form of agricultural 
entertainment and contribute importantly to household income. Self-operated “agritainment” 
businesses provide accommodation, homemade cuisine and fruit, and veggie picking for visitors 
who want to experience farm life and escape from city noise. A table of homemade cuisine for 8 
to 10 people generally cost around 1000 yuan. Agritainment owners utilize home-grown 
vegetables, meats and local seafoods to attract visitors. The most popular agritainments are 
operated by village cadres or their families and friends. Different from the cement farmhouses 
ordinary villagers live in, there is a row of well-painted three-storied farmhouses at the northwest 
of the village, with colorful agritainment signboards. Similar to urban BNBs, agritainment is a 
self-employed family business with no additional government policy support or subsidy. 
Agritainment owners must invest in, design, operate and maintain their own businesses. These 
businesses benefit from festival events and tourist activities held by the village tourist company. 
At Gan Shiao, the mutually beneficial relationship between agritainment businesses and the 
tourist company controlled by the village cadre fuels inequalities. This unequal social, economic 
and natural resource allocation reinforces and reproduces social stratification within the village.  
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Rural residents who lack economic resource or necessary social connections to authorities are 
left behind without sharing the benefits produced through utilizing collective resources.     
  
Local Social Stratification and Income Inequality  
At Zhoushan Islands, rural villages are often named after a notable family and organized 
based on family clans. Generally, local members of the village have the same family name, 
though they do not necessarily have direct blood relationship. Since the social environment and 
network are relative stable and closed, villagers are close to each other, they might be relatives, 
friends or family members. This kind of character generates a tight surveillant network 
comprised of every single villager. In the village, personal character and behavior are directly 
tied to peer evaluation of morality. Certain types of virtues like honesty, obedience, kind-hearted, 
accommodating and fidelity are collectively horned; age and virtue are two important factors to 
build reputation. Since most young generations have migrated out for education, jobs, etc., the 
elderly is left behind. Traditional folkways and social interaction patterns have changed a lot 
with the introduction of modern ideologies and lifestyle, but the traditional family-based social 
organization still has a great influence on inner village social resource distribution and prestige 
establishment. In the case of Gan Shiao, only members with close relationships with the village 
authority can get access to exclusive benefits like receiving dividends from the village travel 
company. Since BNBs are commonly recognized as self-employed businesses, people who fail to 
or lack of resources to operate a BNB are often blamed for their own faults, without considering 
the long-run inner village inequalities and unequal social resource distribution.   
Qin, one female agritainment owner in her late thirty’s has a small restaurant at the 
entrance of Gan Shiao. She came from a different village, so she is not allowed to join Gan 
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Shiao’s tourist company. She leased farmland from villagers of Gan Shiao for fifteen years and 
invested around one million yuan to start her own business. Qin got permission from the village 
committee of Gan Shiao to operate a rural restaurant. She can cultivate on the farmland but is not 
allowed to run a BNB because it would conflict with other BNBs within the village. She received 
fifty thousand yuan from the local government as a subsidy to build necessary facilities initially, 
but never get any other official support.   
“My restaurant is separated from Gan Shiao, visitors who want to order BNB service 
would call village cadres directly, they (village cadres) maintain close relationships with 
their customers…I use WeChat (an instant communication APP) to sell homemade foods 
and keep connection with my customers, the biggest part of my income directly comes 
from take-out orders…I also make traditional and seasonal rural food like Qingbing, a 
rice cake with leave juice, it takes a lot of human labor to make Qingbing, I usually hire 
middle-aged women from nearby villages in 15 to 20 yuan an hour during busy time,” 
Qin said.       
 
Qin purchased seafood and fresh vegetables directly from female villagers in nearby rural 
communities and was thus able to build and grow her own social networks quickly. Qin joined 
one rural village cooperation for home raised poultry sale. This type of inter-village commercial 
alliance aims to establish regional brand and increase competitiveness of local products in 
market. However, there are several different inter-village business alliances, and they may 
compete with each other. Gan Shiao village doesn’t belong to the poultry sale alliance but 
cooperates with other two towns as a united tourist company.  
Village committees create, modify and regulate cooperation between villages. Villagers 
might have the right to vote, but village cadres will make final decisions. Practically, villager’s 
voting right is purely a formal matter, since major social resource and discourse power are 
controlled by village cadres and their acquaintances. Counterviews are not usually counted in 
collective decision-making. Villagers cannot publicly express their discontents. Although there is 
no legal consequence associated with complaining to the officials, people who have 
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counterviews might be marginalized in the village. It is risky to be an “outlier” in a village which 
upholds collectivism. Offenders who refuse to follow the collective will would be stigmatized 
and not get access to public benefits. 
As both retired official He and village cadres of Gan Shiao said, middle aged residents 
work in nearby seafood processing factories or casual work at Zhoushan city because they “have 
nothing to do”. But the truth is far more complex than the perspective from these authority 
figures. Ma, a rural woman in her sixty’s, works at a Hilton Hotel at Zhoushan city as an hourly 
cleaner. She has a son who is in college and a daughter works in another city. Unlike other 
“lucky” rural residents whose homestead was included into government land acquisition plan, 
Ma has to work and save money to support her son. As she explains,  
“we cannot make a living by farming solely, I and my husband still work to save money 
for our only son, we need to buy an apartment as matrimonial home in city for him, I also 
work for seafood processing factories in summer because they (factory owners) usually 
offer higher wages at that time.”            
 
Ma’s experience is not unique. Although local residents make up the majority of 
management workers in the seafood processing factories, rural villagers who have no social 
connections with factory authorities might take work as production workers. But because they 
can speak the local dialect and have similar living backgrounds, these local residents might be 
promoted quickly as long as they are honest and committing to work for the factory owner in the 
long run. As mentioned above, rural villages in this area are traditionally governed by great 
families, villagers share a complex and intertwined social networks with each other based on 
consanguinity, geographical and marital relationships. Although some rural residents have 
relatively low socio-economic status in their villages, their local residency enables them to get 
exclusive and invisible benefits in seafood factories, compared to other migrant workers who 




As part of China’s modernization (especially the ecological modernization plan), PRC’s 
rural urbanization and revitalization policies aim to reduce rural poverty, improve life quality, 
and protect the local environment through rural tourism. However, these policies overlook the 
deeply rooted patriarchal regulatory structure and social network-based interaction pattern in 
rural communities. These traditional structures alter the initial intention of state policies and 
create new inequalities in local rural society. The government land acquisition project 
beneficiaries have made great fortunes overnight, while other rural households remain 
impoverished. Even the wealth gap between villagers of the same rural community is enlarged 
dramatically. Inner village income inequality and unequal social resource distribution intensify 
the conflict between village authorities and ordinary villagers. Only a few elites and their clique 
can access the economic bonus produced through utilizing the common resources in that rural 
community. With the outflow of the young population, it is challenging to erase traditional 
patriarchal-based regulatory mechanism in rural villages. Pressure from peers forces individuals 
to submit to collective will. If someone refused to do so, they might either be marginalized 
through daily social interaction or even be “expelled” from the village.  
For individual BNB owners, there is insufficient government-funded business training 
and support, and village residency plays a crucial role in determining scarce social resource 
distribution. Personal liability lies at the core of rural tourism at Gan Shiao. The belief that “you 
are responsible for your profits and losses” marginalizes those who lack essential economic, 
social, political resources, and educational background to start their BNBs. Village committees 
fail to address such inequality and fulfill their responsibilities to work on behalf of the people. 
Even in inter-village commercial alliances, self-employed rural residents must meet strict criteria 
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to be qualified as the seller of branded rural products. They must find customers by themselves 
because they are responsible for their own business.  
The rural processes discussed above perpetuate existing inequalities and enlarge the 
difference between the privileged villagers and the marginalized. Most middle-aged villagers are 
sandwiched between their responsibilities for supporting their children in college and caring for 
the elderly. Inner village income inequalities and living pressure forcing middle-aged rural 
community members to seek outside jobs to feed their families. In this circumstance, female 
rural residents carry the dual burden of earning additional household income and taking care of 
family members. They take typical women’s jobs in factories and service sectors like deshelling 
seafood, cooking, and cleaning, which require stereotyped female characters such as carefulness, 
patience, and obedience, but receive lower salaries and less respect than their male mates. They 
are also responsible for housework. Gender inequality is (re)produced inside rural society.  
In sum, incomplete policy implementation and government management failure produce 
new inequalities in the local rural communities of Zhoushan Islands. The Chinese government’s 
responsibility for combating rural poverty and improving life quality is displaced to individual 
rural residents without sufficient official support. Instead of erasing the root of rural poverty and 
social inequalities, government policies and the inter-village manipulation of scarce social 
resources force some peasants to become wage laborers in factories and service sectors. In 
contrast, other rural residents have the necessary political, economic, and social connections can 
start successful small businesses. Both government policies that promoted rural revitalization and 
seafood industrial cluster initially intend to improve local life quality for all the people. Still, 
these policies unexpectedly fuel the success for people from great family clans who have 
abundant social, economic, and political capital while excluding residents who lack such capital. 
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These policies often end up reproducing and amplifying already existed inequalities in local 
society. For example, government ecological modernization policy that intends to promote rural 
development and alleviate poverty, such as rural tourism actually produced new income 
inequalities between village residents: it generates exclusive benefits for local power elites such 
as village cadres and their relatives; it also turns marginalized villagers to wage laborers in 
seafood processing factory. Such inner village stratification produces new wage labor for 
seafood factories at Zhoushan Islands. Although local residency enables these workers some 
exclusive benefits compared to migrant workers, key factory management positions are still 
occupied by people who are trusted by factory owners or village cadres. The familiar-based 
social networks still play an important role in determining an individual’s position in seafood 
factory. As being stated at the beginning, the mutual beneficiary relations between successful 
seafood factory owners as new economic elites and village cadres as traditional local power 
elites actively secure scarce resource concentration and the dominant position of great family 
clans at Zhoushan Islands: instead of improving life quality for all the people, new inequalities 
















As Figure 5 displays, there are two major economic phases in China’s modernization 
process: firstly, rapid industrialization and urbanization; secondly, ecological modernization for 
sustainable development. Responding to the great environmental burden resulting from rapid 
economic development in the first phase, PRC proposed ecological modernization as the 
alternative initiative to promote sustainable economic growth. As demonstrated in this thesis, in 
addition to the establishment of the marine industrial cluster, rural tourism was proposed by PRC 
to address problems that emerged with industrialization and promote rural revitalization. China’s 
modernization policies produced different labor migration patterns: before China’s marketization 
reform, peasants were attached to farmland to secure urban residents’ exclusive access to 
government services; since the mid-1980s, peasants were turned into wage-laborers to fuel 
industrialization and urbanization; since 2012, the government has encouraged peasant workers 
in the cities to return to their home villages as a solution for post-modern urban crises. As this 
thesis discussed, policy shifts directed rural labor to fuel industrialization and created a labor 
shortage in Zhoushan seafood industrial cluster nowadays.  
Additionally, PRC’s policies to prioritize urban development have unintentionally 
produced new inequalities between residents of Zhoushan Islands and migrant workers. As 
modernization theory assumed, poverty, inequality, and pollution are inevitable byproducts of 
development. Even ecological modernization theory was proposed by scholars as the alternative 
of industrial-based development, it still fits in the general modernization framework that 
ontologically denies other possibilities for development. In China’s case, major government 
policies shifted from emphasizing industrialization to rural development, but China’s central 
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government still centralizes economic growth in its development plan. This political condition is 
one reason why many China’s modernization policies were often released after social problems 
emerged in society. China’s policy-making process unintentionally creates negative impacts on 














FIGURE 5: Major China’s Modernization and Rural Transformation Policies Discussed in this Thesis 
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emphasizing the invisible consequence of state-led rural transformation policies, and how the 
structural forces shaping the current circumstance in seafood industrial cluster. A theme running 
through this discussion is how factory owners utilize available political, social, and economic 
capital from the elite social networks to build their pathway to succeed in operating their 
business, countering barriers, and handling potential risks.  
This conclusion draws my analysis together by synthesizing the central components of 
factory owner’s pathway to success and the potential risk for people who fail to conform to and 
apply the “commonsense” strategies upheld by other factory owners in this seafood industrial 
cluster. Additionally, this chapter outlines the lingering questions that have not been fully 
addressed in this thesis and makes suggestions for future research.    
 
Pathway to Success 
Strategies often utilized by seafood factory owners at Zhoushan Islands to achieve 
business success focus on two dimensions: internal factory operation and outside social 
relationship maintenance. Factory owners act like the family master who needs to take care of 
inner factory affairs and has to oversee business outside the factory, such as handling potential 
risks and competing with other factories for scarce resources. Perpetuating this family-operated 
business model requires legitimatizing factory owner’s dominant power and absolute control 
over the factory, with the underlying logic that the factory owner owns all material and non-
material substances as well as workers in the factory. Even though there is no legally defined 
private property concept in China, the family master role played by the factory owner enables 
them to have the equivalent responsibility to regulate and protect the factory as private property.  
On the one hand, capital accumulation and profit from exploiting worker’s labor are 
central logics for factory owners to run the business. Factory owners are also responsible for 
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protecting and providing necessities like accommodation, workday lunch, and other benefits. 
These strategies can help factory owners secure the labor force and discipline workers’ bodies. 
Factory owners often varnish their real goals by asserting their sacrifices for the factory and the 
benefits they provided for workers, identifying themselves as a good family master of factory 
affairs. By manipulating local residency, education, and skills to construct the factory labor 
hierarchy, factory owners can separate workers from each other, avoid getting into trouble with 
worker cliches and maintain absolute power. A dense surveillance system—including security 
cameras and other surveillant facilities, appointed production line supervisors, and absolute 
control of important factory positions—ensures everything is under factory owners’ control.  
On the other hand, through maintaining good social relations with key agencies from 
political and economic sectors, factory owners can promote production and handle potential risks 
resulting from policy shifts or other unexpected events such as natural disasters. As this thesis 
shows, state policies such as China’s marketization reform produce the necessary context for the 
boom of family-managed seafood factories at Zhoushan Islands. One of the most important skills 
factory owners have to master to succeed is following and heading to the “right direction” guided 
by the government. The Chinese central government plays a key role in channeling capital and 
resources to specific areas or industries to develop the national economy. Factories that conform 
to state goals often get more government support, such as subsidies and tax cuts. By maintaining 
good social relations with official agencies, factory owners can get first-hand information about 
government development plans. They also can manipulate such social capital to avoid 
punishment for minor legal offenses, especially when their behavior falls in the grey zone not 
clearly defined by laws. Factory owners who failed to manage good relations with official 
agencies bear greater risk of more severe punishment if they disregard laws and of being left 
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behind when new opportunities are released by the government. Another way seafood factory 
owners can manipulate social capital to maintain market competitiveness is through college-
factory collaboration. By providing funds and expensive gifts to college research teams, seafood 
factories that rely on high-tech can keep their products up to date. This industry-college 
interaction looks like a “win-win” collaboration that can benefit both sides, but this relationship 
raises problematic issues related to bribery and academic ethics.  
In sum, this seafood industrial cluster is organized, operated, and based on the familiar 
social networks connecting elites from different sectors. Capital, scarce resources, and 
information are mobilized through the exclusive social connections between key agencies. The 
extended family is the basic unit in this social network, grounded in long-standing moral values 
taken for granted by residents of “honor the family.” In this way, local elites can secure their 
dominant position in political, economic, and social spheres, as well as reproduce the conditions 
that serve their interests.      
 
 
Lingering Questions and Promising Research Approaches 
This thesis discusses the general labor arrangements in the seafood industrial cluster, 
outlines struggles experienced by the marginalized in nearby local rural villages, and details the 
structural forces underpinning inequalities and unequal resource distribution at Zhoushan 
Islands. However, this thesis primarily focuses on the organizational level due to lack of access 
to data collected from workers and community members at the micro-level. Thus, this thesis 
cannot fully capture the specific difficulties encountered by individual workers in pursuing their 
personal will.  
This analysis of the seafood industrial cluster at Zhoushan Islands identifies some 
lingering questions focusing on different units of analysis, especially related to changes resulting 
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from the COVID-19 pandemic. Firstly, questions should be asked about migrant workers’ 
specific everyday struggles and livelihood strategies at the micro level. For example, how do 
migrant workers interact with other workers to obtain necessary resources and experience the 
surveillance and “naming and shaming” strategies enforced by factory supervisors? How do 
workers handle the pressure from the top-to-down control of their bodies, minds, and psyches? 
How do workers keep physical and mental health? What specific strategies do they use for 
upward mobility in the factory and local society? What are the new regulatory schemes invented 
to control worker’s bodies during the pandemic, and how do workers respond to such 
regulations? 
Secondly, at the national level, fundamental questions remain. For example, how has the 
Zhoushan Pilot Free Trade Zone’s establishment contributed to the national economy and shaped 
capital and resource circulation within and between different regions of mainland China? How 
has fishing industrialization and new trading patterns promoted labor migration and domestic 
seafood supply chain changes? And how have the existing commercial connections, supply 
chains, and labor arrangement changed as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic? 
Thirdly, lingering questions remain at the global level. For example, how have Chinese 
state restrictions on importing and exporting due to COVID-19 influenced the global seafood 
commodity chain? What is the global market impact of China’s new policies to limit the spread 
of COVID-19?  
As the lingering questions stated above suggest, there are important new dimensions for 
future research. Future research should focus on multiple levels of analysis and comparative 
analysis. Firstly, the multi-level analysis enables me to answer these questions from different 
perspectives and reveal more than focusing only on one analytical level. For instance, at the 
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micro-level, through examining the interaction between workers, factory supervisors, and factory 
owners, I could draft how symbolic meaning and norms are (re)produced in such interaction and 
detail how workers internalize factory rules to self-regulate their behavior but also create 
potential resistance. At the national level, through discussing how different Chinese industrial 
clusters are interconnected under specific state policies and linked to the national economy, I 
could explore how the seafood industry as an economic stimulation strategy being copied and 
installed in other coast areas of China. I could also discuss the similarities and differences in 
different seafood industrial clusters. At the global level, through analyzing how China’s marine 
industry is connected to the global seafood supply chain and how individual seafood factory gets 
through the international certification process and obtain the approval of import in different 
countries, I could snapshot how China’s seafood factories manage and handle the complex 
trading initiatives across the globe. Then I could analyze how China’s marine industry being 
shaped by the global buyer-driven commodity chain and oversea consumers in addition to 
national policies.  
Secondly, the comparative analysis enables me to compare the situation in seafood 
processing before and after COVID-19 pandemic. Major changes in the seafood supply chain 
also can be captured through this approach. COVID-19 outbreak right after my second trip to 
Zhoushan Islands, which significantly changed how seafood processing was operated and 
managed to guarantee workers and products’ safety. Seafood production in this industrial cluster 
might shift from labor-intensive to other types of production because of COVID-19. Questions 
listed above can be answered through comparatively analyzing how seafood supply chain, 
factory regulatory scheme, and other factory operation have changed after COVID-19 pandemic. 
Additionally, the comparative analysis of risk management strategies utilized by seafood 
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factories at Zhoushan Islands parallels with the multi-level analysis. It completes the whole 
picture of the Zhoushan seafood industry within the global, national and regional contexts.  
While this thesis provides a macro picture of the seafood industrial cluster at Zhoushan 
Islands and summarizes major social problems emerging in this place, future research should 
take global, national, and local changes into consideration to reveal the multi-dimensional 
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APPENDIX 1. TABLE 2: Government Policies Discussed in This Study (Xue et al. 2021) 
 
China’s Government 
Policies & Major 
Historical 
Transformations 
Publishing Institutions Chinese Translation Hallmark Events 
 










China’s Ministry of 
Public Security 
 
1964 Gong an bu guan 
yu chu li hu kou qian yi 






1982 No.1 Central 
Document1 
 
The General Office of 
the CCP Central 
Committee  
1982 Zhong yang yi 
hao wen jian 
(1982 中央一号文件) 
PRC started officially 
acknowledging the 
post-socialist reform 
and prioritizing rural 




(HRS) was officially 








rural labor was 
removed from 
agricultural sectors to 
the industrial and 












The Fifteenth Session 
of the Sixteenth Central 












PRC’s effort to address 
urban-rural 
stratification, deal with 
returning migrant 









17th National Congress 
of the CCP 





protection and resource 
conservation in its 
national and rural 
development plans 
 
2013 No.1 Central 
Document 
 
The General Office of 
the CCP Central 
Committee 
 
2013 Zhong yang yi 




protection as the 





(PPA) and Rural 
Entrepreneurship  
 
18th National Congress 
of the CCP 
2012 Jing zhun fu pin 
& wan zhong chuang 
ye 
(精准扶贫&万众创业) 
PRC utilized top-down 
mobilization to address 









The General Office of 




2013 Zhong yang yi 







(mei li xiang cun) 
 
2014 No.1 Central 
Document 
 
The General Office of 
the CCP Central 
Committee 
 
2014 Zhong yang yi 
hao wen jian 
(2014中央一号文件) 
 
PRC issued guidelines 
to separate land tenure 
to the three land rights 
system: govern 
ownership right, 
contractual land right, 
and land use/operation 
right (san quan fen zhi)  
 








The General Office of 




2015 Gu li nong min 
gong deng ren yuan fan 





workers returning home 






The General Office of 
the CCP Central 
Committee & the 
Ministry of Agriculture 
and Rural Affairs 
(MARA) 
2018 Xiang cun zhen 




PRC’s investments in 
rural entrepreneurship 
to promote economic 
growth and alleviate 




 employment, promote 
rural industry and 
leisure tourism   
    
1No.1 Central Document is the first government document issued by the General Office of the CCP Central Committee every 
year, most of them focusing on rural problems 
 
